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Summary 
ISA Consult; European Institute, University of 
Sussex; GJW Europe 
September 1997 
A process of democratisation has been  underway in  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  since  the  end  of  the  1980s.  The  countries  of 
Central Europe  have  moved  fastest towards democracy and,  in-
deed, in most of these countries, the formal procedures of democ-
racy  are  in  place.  This  is  not the  case  further to  the  East  even 
though  progress  has  been  made  in  nearly  all  countries.  In  all 
countries, there are major weaknesses in substantive democracy, 
that is say, the  extent to  which  individual citizens can  participate 
in  decision-making and influence the situation  in  which  they live. 
In  most countries, there are efforts to  correct these weaknesses. 
In  a few  countries,  for  example  Slovakia,  a struggle  to  sustain 
democracy is going on, and some countries, notably Belarus and 
Kazakhstan  in  Central  Asia,  are  moving  towards  new  types  of 
dictatorship. 
Western countries have provided considerable amounts of assis-
tance to  Central and  Eastern  Europe to  stimulate the  process of 
democratisation. The PTDP, the European Union's programme of 
democracy  assistance,  began  in  1992  on  an  initiative  of  the 
European Parliament. From  1993 to  1996, the overall budget line 
was 76 mio ECU; 56°/o was spent in  Phare countries and 44°/o  in 
Tacis  countries.  The  PTDP  includes three  types  of projects:  ad 
hoc projects decided by the Commission to  meet a specific need; 
macro-projects which involve partnerships between NGOs in  East 
and West and are decided through bi-annual competitions by the 
Commission;  and  smaller  micro-projects  which  are  approved  in 
the countries concerned. 
ISA  Consult,  the  Sussex  European  Institute,  and  GJW  Europe 
were  asked to  evaluate the  political  impact of the  PTDP  in  nine 
countries - five Phare countries and four Tacis countries. This is a 
very difficult task given the relatively small size of the programme 
in  relation  to  the  enormity  of  the  challenge  of  democratisation, 
and  given  the  short time  available  to  undertake  the  study.  Our 
approach was first to assess the weaknesses and strengths of the 
process of democratisation  using a methodology developed in  a 
previous  project  for the  Commission  and  secondly  to  examine 
particular projects and programmes in  each  of the nine countries 
to  assess  how far they contributed  to  strengths  and  addressed 
weaknesses.  Although  our terms  of  reference  were  to  evaluate 
the political impact, we found it necessary also to investigate pro-
cedures and management because these were  affecting the  po-
litical impact. II 
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To carry out the study, we used a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  In  addition  to  a statistical  and  documentary 
analysis, we did background studies for each of the nine countries 
partly  commissioned  to  local  experts,  we  undertook  extensive 
interviews with  recipients as well  as with  officials and  others en-
gaged in the programme-, and we organised round tables in  Brus-
sels  and  in  each  of the  nine  countries.  Our conclusions  can  be 
summarised as follows: 
Political Impact 
The most significant impact of Western democracy assistance in 
general, and  the PTDP in particular, has been the contribution to 
the growth of a lively NGO sector in all countries. The NGO sector 
has  been  important  in  lobbying  for  political  reform  to  correct 
weaknesses in both formal and substantive democracy, in provid-
ing a bulwark against the reversion to  authoritarianism, in  chang-
ing  political culture  particularly where  it has  spread  to  the  coun-
tryside, and in providing a form of critical monitoring of the evolu-
tion  of democracy. What has been  created  with  the  help  of for-
eign  funds is  a moral community in  all these countries,  including 
groups and individuals who  are  essential to  the construction of a 
democratic political culture, who  lobby for democratic change and 
who constitute an  ongoing form  of  public discussion and  educa-
tion. 
In general, the NGO sector is more developed in  Phare countrles 
than  in  Tacis countries.  NGOs  are  more  numerous and  the  pro-
portion of NGOs  outside  capital cities  is  greater.  This  is  partly a 
reflection of political culture; the totalitarian experience has been 
not so long and perhaps less deep. And partly it reflects levels of 
economic  development.  Where  incomes  are  very  low,  there  is 
very little voluntary  activity  and  few  sources  of  internally gener-
ated funding. 
Western assistance has not only been important for financial rea-
sons.  It  has been  important psychologically;  it represents  an  af-
firmation  of  the  value  of  the  projects  that are  supported.  It  has 
been  important politically both  in  raising  the  visibility of  recipient 
NGOs and, in more authoritarian countries, by providing a form of 
protection. And it has been important in practical terms, in provid-
ing training and offering a learning experience in planning, imple-
menting and evaluating projects. 
It  is  difficult to  distinguish  the  effects  of  the  PTDP  from  other 
forms  of  Western  assistance.  Nevertheless,  certain  features  of 
the PTDP can be singled out: 
a)  The  EU  label  is  very  important.  It  raises  the  prestige  and 
credibility of the recipient projects.  It represents a stamp of legiti-
macy. This has been especially important in  the  Phare countries, PTDP Evaluation Report  Summary 
the aspiring members of the  EU.  It also offers protection against 
arbitrary action  by the  authorities.  This  has been particularly  im-
portant in Slovakia and in Tacis countries. 
b)  European  partnerships are  important. The  PTDP  has allowed 
and  speeded  up the  exchange  of  know  how between  east and 
west  and  the  building  up  of  highly ·valuable  networks.  This  in-
cludes  Human  Rights  and  Peace  movements  like  the  Helsinki 
family, but also many less known groups from Western Europe. 
c) The bottom-up approach in the selection of macro- and micro-
projects  and  the  fact that these  projects do  not have  to  be  ap-
proved  by  recipient  governments,  in  contrast  to  other  EU  pro-
grammes, is also very important. Potential applicants are likely to 
have a better understanding of their own  society than  outsiders; 
the  composition  of  applications  tends  to  reflect the  priorities for 
democracy as  seen  from  within  society.  Moreover,  the  kinds  of 
projects that are supported by the  PTDP  represent a political sig-
nal  about the  character of  the  EU  especially  since  they  do  not 
have  to  be  approved  by governments.  The  call  for applications, 
the  conferences  on  PTDP,  etc.,  involve  quite  a  wide  group  of 
people and guarantees visibility within a broader public. 
The impact of the PTDP seems to have been greater in the Phare 
countries than  in  the Tacis countries. There  are  several reasons 
for this. First, more money has been spent both absolutely and in 
relation to  population  in  the  Phare  countries.  Secondly,  because 
indigenous NGO capacities are greater in the Phare countries, the 
multiplier effect of democracy assistance is  also greater. Thirdly, 
the approach to the Phare countries has put more emphasis on a 
bottom-up-approach. The micro-projects have been a big success 
and  the  top-down  ad  hoc projects  have  accounted  for  a  much 
smaller share of the total. Finally, in some cases, projects in Tacis 
countries were dominated by Western partners and local partners 
were rather weak. This partly reflects the  greater weaknesses of 
the NGO sector in these countries - reinforcing the point about the 
enabling  character  of  such  assistance.  The  absence  of  micro-
projects in  Tacis countries has meant the  absence  of a learning 
process through which NGOs could acquire the necessary knowl-
edge to graduate to macro-project. 
The division between micro-, macro-, and ad  hoc projects seems 
to be  appropriate.  Micro-projects have developed in  a very posi-
tive way in those countries where they exist. Micro-projects are far 
easier to handle than macro-projects, they cover the whole coun-
try (and  especially rural  regions),  they meet local grassroots de-
mands,  they  actively  involve  many  people,  they  considerably 
contribute  to  the  visibility  of  the  Programme,  and  they  have  a 
positive impact on the reputation of the European Union. They are 
especially  useful  in  assisting  the  ,,second  generation" of  NGOs. 
Ill IV 
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But macro-projects remain relevant, too. Many NGOs which have 
applied for micro-projects successfully ,risk" applying for a macro-
projects as a second or third step. These projects are especially 
valuable  because of their international character and the  oppor-
tunities for cross-border cooperation and also because of the way 
they contribute to the professionalisation and institutionalisation of 
NGOs. The partnership element is highly appreciated, and NGOs 
generally have had good experience with  their partners, and the 
latter can transfer skills and know-how. The multi-country or hori-
zontal ad hoc projects are also valuable. A substantial part of the 
ad  hoc projects consists of joint programmes with  other interna-
tional institutions, for example for election monitoring; these might 
be better funded under a separate budget. 
Procedures and Management 
The selection of projects seems to have been managed relatively 
well.  Although  areas  of  activity are  not balanced,  in  general the 
selection  does  seem  to  reflect  the  needs  of  the  countries  con-
cerned. There has been a remarkably low rate of failure. 
The main problem concerns contracting and payments for macro-
projects and  ad  hoc projects.  Recipients  complain  about compli-
cated  application  procedures,  delays  in  contracting  and  in  pay-
ments, lack of transparency and communication problems. These 
administrative difficulties cause considerable frustration and dam-
age the image of the PTDP  and the European Union. There is a 
need  to  overhaul  contracting  and  payments  procedures  and  to 
increase transparency and improve communications, especially in 
the case of ad hoc projects. 
Recommendations 
Our main  conclusion  is  that the  PTDP  has been  of considerable 
value for the development of democracy and civil society in  Cen-
tral  and  Eastern  Europe.  It  has  contributed  to  the  growth  of  an 
NGO sector in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which 
plays a crucial role  in  the process of democratisation.  Moreover, 
the programme is equally important for the European Union itself. 
Overall, it contributes positively to the image of the EU in  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe;  recipients  constitute  a  valuable  source  of 
critical knowledge about these countries which  can  assist policy-
making; European partnerships help to build trans-European links 
at the  level  of  society.  Because  of  the  inadequacy of internally 
generated funding  for NGOs,  for some  time  to  come,  the  NGO 
sector in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  will  be  dependent on  for-
eign funding and it is important that the  European  Union plays a 
prominent role  both  in  those countries that are to  begin negotia-
tions for membership as  well  as these countries for whom mem-PTDP Evaluation Report  Summary 
bership is  a more  distant prospect.  For these  reasons,  there  re-
mains  an  urgent  need  for  the  PTDP  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe in the future. 
Thus we conclude that the PTDP  should be  maintained and  fur-
ther expanded and  improved.  Detailed  recommendations  for im-
provement are contained in the last chapter. 
v Summary  PTOP Evaluation Report 
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1. Introduction: 
The Development of the Phare and Tacis Democracy 
Programme and the Purpose of Evaluation 
1.1  The Development of the 
Phare and Tacls Democracy Programme 
The relations of the European Union with the  countries in  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe have changed dramatically since  1989. The 
peaceful change  in  Central  Europe and  the former Soviet Union 
has  opened  new opportunities  for  economic and  political  devel-
opment  which  were  previously  unthinkable.  The  debate  in  the 
European  Union  has  moved  very  fast from  a situation  in  which 
first help programmes had been  created  (the  original  Phare  pro-
gramme  in  1989 - Poland  Hungary Aid  for the  Reconstruction  of 
the  Economy)  to  one  in  which  pre-accession  strategies for new 
EU  members  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (Agenda  2000) 
are being considered. 
From  the  beginning  the  EU  decided  to  support  the  process  of 
economic and political change through aid programmes. Although 
the  main  emphasis  of  Phare  and  Tacis  was  on  the  transfer  of 
economic know  how and  skills  related  to  the  private  sector and 
privatisation,  both  programmes  also  included  help  for preparing 
new  legislation,  developing  new  administrative  structures  and 
institutions and other elements which can constitute a fully demo-
cratic and civic society. By the end of 1996 the EU had altogether 
provided  ECU  6.6 billion under Phare and  ECU  2.8 billion  under 
Tacis. 
The political basis of Phare  and Tacis is  the  Europe  Agreement 
(agreed first with  Hungary and Poland and later on  with  all  appli-
cants for EU  Membership) which  enshrines a commitment by all 
parties "to  pluralist democracy based on  the  rule  of  law,  human 
1 2 
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rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  a  multiparty  system  involving 
free  democratic elections,  to  the  principle  of  a market  economy 
and to  social justice, which  constitutes the basis for the  associa-
tion." 
The  overall  goals  of  the  Phare  and  Tacis  programmes  are  the 
reorientation of the economies in these countries and support for 
the  establishment of market economies and  the  development of 
pluralistic  political  systems.  The  internal  priorities  of  the  pro-
grammes and  instruments used  to  fulfil  these  goals changed  as 
the reforms began taking hold in  most countries.  Both  Phare and 
Tacis have  adapted to  the  changing  economic and social  needs 
in the course of the transition process and,  in  particular, have  in-
creased  support for public administration  reform  and  institutional 
development.  New  types  of  programmes  within  the  Phare  and 
Tacis  framework  were  introduced  which  aimed  at  more  specific 
social  and  political  goals.  One  of  these  programmes started  on 
the initiative of the European Parliament in  1992 was the  Democ-
racy Programme. 
The original proposal for a "European Democracy Fund" changed 
during the political debate in  the  Parliament into a vote  to  estab-
lish  a  specific  budget  line  under  Phare  starting  in  1992. 
(Blackman  1996:  23pp)  In  its  first  announcement  of  the  pro-
gramme the Commission stated that: 
''The  main  aim  of the  programme  is  to  contribute to  the develop-
ment  of  pluralist  democratic  procedures  and  practices  and  the 
rule  of law ....  While  Western  attention  and  assistance has  been 
focused  largely  on  the  creation  of  market  economies  in  the 
CEECs,  support  is  also  required  to  help  establish  the  political, 
legal and civic institutions which  are crucial to achieving the politi-
cal  consensus  and  stability  required  for  economic  reforms.  In 
addition  to  work  on  economic  restructuring  and  policy  reforms, 
Phare  has  begun  to  provide  assistance  for the  reform  of  public PTDP Evaluation Report  Introduction 
administration,  for  local  government  development  and  for 
strengthening civil society. The Democracy Programme, which will 
seek to  complement these  and  other bilateral  or multilateral  aid 
operations, will  co-finance projects submitted by both  public and 
private  bodies  bringing  together  partner  organisations  in  the 
CEECs and in the Member States of the European Community. 
The specific objectives of the  Phare  Democracy Programme  are 
to support: 
a)  the acquisition of knowledge and techniques about democratic 
practices and  the  rule  of  law  by  relevant bodies and  profes-
sionals in the CEECs, 
b)  the strengthening of local associations and  institutions which, 
by their vocation,  can  make  a continuing  contribution  to  the 
promoting of a pluralistic society." (EU  Information note on the 
Phare Democracy Programme, August 1992) 
The  Commission  also  decided  to  set  up  the  Programme  differ-
ently from other Phare instruments: 
•  the  democracy programme does not operate  by any country 
quotas 
•  it  is  not  agreed  between  the  Commission  and  the  govern-
ments of the CEECs. The Commission deals directly with  ap-
plicants from individual groups, bodies and private NGOs and 
specifically encourages "grass roots" developments as part of 
its general policy to support the development of civil society. 
The  programme  was  successful  implemented  and  developed  in 
1992.  In  the  first  year  52  projects  in  11  Phare  countries  were 
funded for a total of  5 mio  ECU  . In  1993 the  Programme  was 
extended to  all  Phare countries as well  as to  the Tacis countries 
and the budget was raised to  10 mio  ECU.  In  the same year, the 
3 4 
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Commission  decided  to  hand  the  practical  management  and 
monitoring of the Programme over to the European Human Rights 
Foundation. And it introduced two new instruments: so  called  mi-
cro-projects and ad-hoc/own initiative actions. 
Today assistance  in  the  framework of the  Phare  and  Tacis  De-
mocracy Programme (PTDP) is channelled through: 
a)  Macro-projects (max.  200.000 ECU) for which  NGOs can  ap-
ply twice a year. Projects should have a European dimension 
and involve normally both  local  and  EU-based organisations. 
Publicity, pre-selection, contract management and monitoring 
is done by the EH RF. 
b)  Micro-projects  (max.  10.000  ECU)  which  are  given  to  local 
NGOs, mainly in Phare countries. The EU delegations in each 
country  manage  independently  the  publicity,  selection,  con-
tract management and monitoring. 
c)  Ad-hoc support/ own  initiatives which  are  selected and  man-
aged by the Commission. Ad-hoc-projects may be  horizontal, 
or may concern unforeseen needs, where a prompt response 
is required. 
The Commission has defined eight areas of activity on  which the 
PTDP should focus: 
1. Parliamentary practice and procedures, 
2. Transparency of public administration and public management 
3. Development of NGOs and representative structures 
4. Independent, pluralistic and responsible media, 
5. Awareness building and civic education, 
6. Promoting and monitoring human rights, 
7. Civilian monitoring of security structures, 
8. Minority rights, equal opportunities and non-discrimination. 
The  original  objectives  of  the  programme  have been  slightly re-
formulated under three points: 
ISACONSULT (2) 
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a)  the acquisition of knowledge and techniques of parliamentary 
practice  and  procedures  by  multi-party  groups· of  politicians 
and by parliamentary staff, 
b)  the  strengthening  of  Non-Governmental  Organisations 
(NGOs) and associations which by their vocation and activities 
can make a contribution to the promotion of a pluralist society, 
c)  the  transfer  of  specific  expertise  and  technical  skills  about 
democratic practice and the rule of law to professional groups 
and associations in the CEEC and NIS concerned. 
For  all  macro- and  micro-projects  only  NGOs  are  eligible.  In 
macro-projects  a specific  East-West  or  (later  on)  East-East  co-
operation is required in order to guarantee a transfer of know how 
Table  1: Development of the PTDP Programme 
Year  Countries  Budget  Management/Instruments 
targeted 
1992  all Phare  5 mio ECU  52 macro-projects 
Commission, Phare Programme 
Unit and Consultant 
1993  Phare and  14 mio ECU  Macro-projects, ad-hoc initiatives 
Tacis  EHRF, consultant, Commission 
Phare and Tacis Programme Units 
1994  Phare and  20 mio ECU  Macro-projects, ad-hoc initiatives, 
Tacis  micro-projects Phare 
EHRF, Commission Phare and 
Tacis Programme Units 
1995  Phare and  22 mio ECU  Macro-projects, ad-hoc initiatives, 
Tacis  micro-projects Phare 
EHRF, Commission Ph are and 
Tacis Programme Units 
1996  Phare and  20 mio ECU  Macro-projects, ad-hoc initiatives, 
Tacis  micro-projects Phare 
EHRF, Commission PTDP Pro-
_g_ramme  Unit 
Although  the  programme  remained  small  in  terms  of  level  of 
funding (about 1  °/o  of the  whole  Ph are  and  Tacis budget) it had 
from the beginning a high  political profile and received consider-
5 6 
Introduction  PTDP Evaluation Report 
able  attention  from  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  of 
Europe  as  well  as  from  a large  number of  national  and  interna-
tional NGOs, who submitted proposals to the PTDP. It operated in 
a fast changing environ~ent  in which many other institutions were 
engaged in  similar initiatives. Among them  are  the private  Sores 
Foundation,  and  programmes  undertaken by  almost all  Western 
Governments (the most important is the US). 
The Commission therefore decided in  1996 to  undertake an inde-
pendent evaluation of the PTDP, which started in April 1997. 
1.2 The Evaluation Framework 
1.2. 1 Terms of Reference 
According to  the  terms of  reference defined by the  Commission, 
the  impact of  the  EU  funded  operations  in  the  framework  ~f the 
PTDP  were  to  be  analysed  using  nine  selected  countries  as  an 
example.  Out  of  the  13  Phare  countries  the  Commission  chose 
Poland,  Hungary,  Slovakia,  Estonia  and  Romania.  Out  of  ·13 
Tacis  countries,  Russia,  Belarus,  Georgia and  Kazakhstan  were 
selected. 
The  terms  of  reference  specified  that  the  impact  of  the  PTDP 
should  be  measured  in  terms  of  its  contribution  to  the  achieve-
ment of the political objectives and its role in promoting the devel-
opment of more democratic societies, the rule  of law,  respect for 
human  rights,  as well  as the  establishment of institutional frame-
works and the introduction of new procedures and practices. 
The  evaluation  of  the  PTDP  and  the  projects funded  under this 
budget line  are  seen  as  an  objective  ex-post examination  of  the 
background,  objectives,  and  impact  of  projects,  as  well  as  the 
means deployed during project implementation. The key question PTDP Evaluation Report  Introduction 
is: Has the project effected real change in  line with the objectives 
of the original programme? 
Therefore eight key indicators were identified for the evaluation: 
1.  Relevance of the interventions to the problem to be addressed, 
2.  Consistency with policy guidelines, 
3.  Adequacy of procedures including the implementation of proj-
ect selection procedures, 
4.  Cost-Effectiveness of a selected number of activities under-
taken in terms of addressing needs, 
5.  The longer-term impact, both intended and unintended, 
6.  Sustain  ability, 
7.  Replicability, 
8.  Visibility. 
The  main  purpose  of the  evaluation  is  to  improve  the  impact of 
EU  funded  operations  under PTDP.  A  second  key  question  for 
the evaluation therefore is: What actions should be  taken  to  im-
prove the effectiveness of the PTDP in future? 
1.2.2 Methodological Approach - Questions for Evaluation 
The criteria for evaluating the impact of the PTDP funding have to 
be developed on two levels: 
•  First,  the  evaluation  of  the  impact  and  effectiveness  of  the 
PTDP overall. Has the PTDP effected real changes in line with 
the  objectives  of  the  original  programme  and  the  political 
goals of the EU? 
•  Second,  the  evaluation  of  single  elements  and  projects 
funded  under PTDP.  Have  selected  single  projects  effected 
real  changes  in  line  with  the  objectives  of their original  pro-
posals? 
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As far as the impact of the whole PTDP is concerned any evalua-
tion has to follow a differentiated approach taking into account the 
specific  obstacles  to  democracy  in  each  individual  country,  the 
extent to which the programme is directed towards the removal of 
these specific obstacles and the way in which the programme has 
been implemented. 
Core questions for an evaluation are: 
•  Is the Programme defined properly to address relevant ques-
tions in the Phare and Tacis countries? 
•  Does it relate the specific country context to overall EU goals? 
•  Is the Programme definition adequately translated into policy 
guidelines and levels of funding? 
•  Is the Programme effectively implemented? 
•  Does the selection of projects fit the definition of the pro-
gramme? 
•  Is the particular mix of projects for all countries and in selected 
countries appropriate? 
•  Is the intervention relevant to particular needs in a country? 
•  How far has the programme contributed to the furtherance 
and the development of a democratic civil society? 
This evaluation involved a two stage process. First, it was neces-
sary to  identify the  strengths and  weaknesses of the  process of 
democratisation in  each  country using a methodology developed 
in an earlier project which distinguished between formal and sub-
stantive democracy. (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997). Secondly, it was 
necessary to examine the programme in  each country in  the light 
of the findings at the first stage. 
For the evaluation of selected projects funded under PTDP partly 
the same questions are relevant. However, these projects have to 
be measured by their own  objectives put forward in  their applica-PTDP Evaluation Report  Introduction 
tions and  also  by their contribution  to  substantive democracy  in 
their countries. Questions are: 
•  Did the project meet its objectives? 
•  What valuable consequences did it have? 
•  Did it empower target groups? 
•  Did it contribute to new networks of NGOs? 
•  Did it provide a medium for civic education and participation? 
•  Has it strengthened organisational capacities of a NGO and 
extended range and type of activities? 
•  Was the project visible in public? 
•  Can it sustain itself? 
Additionally  a third  factor is  relevant  for  the  impact  of  the  pro-
gramme and  therefore  also  for this  evaluation.  The  organisation 
and management of the PTDP itself. The programme is compara-
tively small and has three almost independent categories of proj-
ects,  which  are  managed  by  different  institutions:  the  macro-
projects by the EHRF; the micro-projects by the EU delegations in 
the different countries;  and  the  ad-hoc-projects  by the  Commis-
sion  itself. The  impact of all  these  elements is  directly related  to 
management and implementation. Questions are: 
•  Are the procedures of grant allocation clear and efficient? 
•  How do the different parts of PTDP operate in practice? 
•  What is the feedback from its customers? 
•  How are selection processes? 
•  How cost effective is the management? 
•  How does planning and monitoring of the PTDP work? 
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Methodological constraints: 
How to measure the Impact of PTDP? 
The development of democracy and civil societies is influenced by a multitude of factors 
which can not be separated from each other.  First, it is  linked closely to the develop-
ment of  democratic institutions and procedures. Second, it also depends on the devel-
opment of the economic situation and the institutions of markets. Third, democracy and 
civil society are processes which have to be reproduced in the everyday lives of  ordi-
nary people. One could call this "transferring democratic genes into society•  (Quigley, 
1996) or more simply, building up inside a society democratic practices, including citi-
zen participation and new thinking. 
The impact of  a single programme like PTDP on this complex process can never be 
measured exactly. There exist no clear set indicators by which one can single out the 
impact of a special project. In the recently finished interim evaluation of the whole Phare 
programme these methodological problems are correctly described: "First, it is seldom 
possible to compare "with/without"  project scenarios,  especially in the turbulent eco-
nomic and institutional context of transition economies. This makes it hard to estimate 
the impact of a programme: what would have happened without it? 
Second, technical assistance outputs are intangibles, identifiable through indirect indica-
tors only  .... Typical outputs are trained staff, advisory documents, legal drafts and or-
ganisational proposals  ....  The lack of counterfactual evidence renders it difficult to know 
the outcome for the institutions if these programmes had not been established: (Interim 
Evaluation Phare, 1997) 
Third, the outputs of PTDP may be indistinguishable from outputs of other programmes 
sponsored by other donors (like Sores for example). 
Fourth, possible outputs can easily be contradicted if they are not supported by appro-
priate local policies.  In general, establishing a link between changes in individual behav-
iour or institutional behaviour and specific programmes will always be a complicated en-
deavour. 
Bearing these limitations in mind it is nevertheless possible to describe specific results 
and draw conclusions on the impact of  single projects and elements of  PTDP. In  our 
evaluation we will describe the impact on six different levels, mainly using general ob-
servations and examples from  single projects as  a proof.  Impact is described on  the 
level of: 
•  the overall development of democracy and civil society 
•  the development of specific policy areas - like media, law etc. 
•  the growth of the NGO sector 
•  single project outcomes (people involved, social & political outreach etc.) 
•  visibility of EU policy in favour of democratic institutions 
•  know how transfer and East-West network building 
1.2.3 Evaluation Steps - Participation in the Evaluation 
In the terms of reference a number of instruments were described 
which were used throughout the evaluation. These include: 
•  an in-house workshop with members of the Programme Unit, 
the EHRF and other key personnel in Brussels 
•  expert interviews with the "co-ordinators" of the PTDP, the 
EH RF and other experts 
•  review of existing project reports 
•  review of existing monitoring and assessment reports PTDP Evaluation Report  Introduction 
•  analysis of statistical material available at the EHRF and the 
Programme Unit 
•  desk review of existing documents and evaluation reports re-
lated to PTDP 
•  background studies on the development of democracy and 
.  civil society in the countries under evaluation 
•  roundtable discussions with NGO representatives, members 
of EU delegations, and other experts in nine countries on the 
impact of PTDP 
•  interviews with key persons in the nine selected countries 
•  project visits and discussions with NGOs which undertook 
projects under PTDP 
Additionally we have used a broad range of literature available on 
the general topic of  societies in transition and the development of 
democracy. The background studies, which are part of the mate-
rials  in  the  appendix to  this  evaluation  report,  either have  been 
written by members of the evaluation team or by experts from the 
country under evaluation. For all project interviews an open ques-
tionnaire was used. 
We have tried to involve as many key stakeholders related to  the 
PTDP as possible. The evaluation was planned to  be  undertaken 
in  a collaborative way,  involving as  much  as  possible  all  groups 
working  with  the  PTDP.  Beside  the  research  and  interviews  in 
Brussels,  the  report  is  mainly  based  on  11  country  visits,  10 
roundtables with  155 persons participating and a total of 94 proj-
ect interviews, which took place between mid  May and early July 
1997. (Table 2 gives an overview on the number of interviews and 
people contacted). 
In  this  report,  we  begin  with  an  assessment of  the  evolution  of 
democracy in  the nine countries against which  the  impact of  the 
PTDP is to be assessed. We then provide a statistical overview of 
the  PTDP,  followed by a summary of our findings  about the  im-
pact of the PTDP in the nine countries. This is followed by a sepa-
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rate  chapter on  the  management and  organisation  of the  PTDP. 
Our conclusions and recommendations  are  contained  in  the  final 
chapter. 
Table 2: Interviews, Roundtables and Project Visits 
Country  Roundtable  Expert  Project  other 
participants  Interviews  Interviews  activities 
Brussels  In-house wori<shop  18  --- participation in wori<shop 
6th May, 20 persons  conflict prevention network 
Russia  Roundtable Moscow,  Moscow 12  Moscow 10  two background studies on 
19 May, 15 people;  Petersburg 6  Petersburg 8  general development and 
Roundt. Petersburg,  NGO situation 
26 June, 16 people 
Geor3la  Roundtable, 1 July,  8  10  background study 
16 people 
Kazakhstan  Roundtable, 3 June,  6  10  background study 
12 people 
Belarus  Roundtable 19 June,  6  8  background study 
16 people 
Hungary  Roundtable 26 June,  4  10  background study 
22 people 
Poland  Roundtable 30 May,  6  8  background study 
14 people 
Estonia  Roundtable 1  0 July,  3  10  background study 
16 people 
Roman/a  Roundtable 1  0 July,  7  10  background study 
10 people 
Slovakia  Roundtable 20 June,  6  10  background study 
18 people 
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2. The Evolution of Democracy: An Overview 
2.1  Formal and Substantive Democracy 
In order to assess progress towards democracy, we  used a meth-
odology  developed  in  an  earlier project for the  European  Com-
mission.  (Kaldor and  Vejvoda  1996).  We  drew a distinction  be-
tween  formal  and  substantive  democracy.  Formal  democracy 
concerns the  procedures and  institutions of democracy and  is  a 
necessary condition  for substantive  democracy.  Substantive  de-
mocracy  is  about  the  empowerment  of  citizens,  the  degree  to 
which citizens are able to participate in  political life and  influence 
the situation in which they live. 
It  is  possible  to  draw  up  a  list  of  criteria  for  formal  democracy 
which can be used, for example, as a way of measuring eligibility 
to  join organisations of democratic countries or for various  kinds 
of  conditionality.  These  formal  criteria are:  inclusive  citizenship  -
nearly all  residents  can  acquire  citizenship;  the  rule  of  law;  the 
separation of powers between the  executive,  the  legislature  and 
the judiciary; the election of powerholders; free  and fair elections 
in  which  all  citizens  can  vote;  freedom  of  expression  and  the 
availability  of  alternative  sources  of  information;  associational 
autonomy; and democratic control of the security services. Table 
3 summarises our findings about formal democracy,  using mate-
rial  from  commissioned  background  studies  and  our  own  mis-
sions. 
The five  Phare  countries included  in  the  study  have  all  more  or 
less  attained  formal  democracy.  The  main  exception  is  Estonia 
which  does not have  an  inclusive  citizenship.  A very substantial 
minority  of  Russian  residents  of  Estonia  have  not been  able  to 
acquire  citizenship.  Consequently,  they  cannot  vote  in  national 
elections and  they have  difficulty in  obtaining  travel  documents. 
Formally, they are eligible for citizenship on the basis of residency 
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but there  are  many bureaucratic  obstacles  to  naturalisation,  in-
cluding  the  Estonian  language  requirement.  Estonians  were 
automatically granted  citizenship  on  the  basis  that  they  or their 
parents were  citizens before  1940. Among  the  Phare  countries, 
formal democracy is weakest In  Slovakia and  Romania although 
there  have  been  dramatic  improvements  in  Romania  since  the 
1996 elections in which a coalition of democratic parties defeated 
the post-communist government that had ruled since 1989. 
Table 3: Formal Democracy: Main Criteria 
Belarus  Estonia  Georgia  Hungary  Kazakh- Poland 
stan 
Inclusive 
Citizenship  B  c  A  A  A  A 
Rule of  Law 
0  B/C  c  AlB  c  AlB 
Separation of 
0  A  B  A  D  A  Powers 
Elected Pow-
erholders  c  A*  A  A  c  A 
Free and Fair 
Elections  c  A*  B  A  D  A 
Freedom of 
Expression  D  A  B  A  B/C  A 
and alt Inform. 
Associational 
Autonomy  8/C  A  A  A  B/C  A 
Democratic 
control of  Sec.  D  A  B/C  A  D  A 
Forces 
A= Formal Procedures are in place and mostly implemented, 
B= Formal Procedures are in place but incomplete implementation, 
C= Formal procedures are in place but hindrances to implementation, 
D= Formal procedures are not in place. 
•  Excluding the Russian minority 
14 
Romania  Russia  Slovakia 
A  A  A 
AlB  c  B 
B  B  B 
A  A  A 
AlB  B  A 
A  AlB  A 
A  AlB  A 
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The  situation  of  the  four Tacis  countries that we  investigated  is 
very different. Belarus and Kazakhstan are both  characterised by 
personal  dictatorships  around  post-communist  leaders  - Alexan-
der  Lukashenko  and  Nultan  Nuzarbaev  respectively.  Indeed  in 
Belarus,  the  situation  has  dramatically  deteriorated  since  the 
election  of  Lukashenko  in  1994 when  he  began  his  war against 
first  the  media,  then  the  Parliament  and  then  the  constitutional 
court.  The  new constitution promulgated by  Lukashenko  in  1996 
and then "legitimised" in  a fraudulent referendum gives the  Presi-
dent more  or less  unlimited powers.  He  has  a monopoly  on  the 
media. (The then  head of the  Parliament was not allowed to  give 
an  election broadcast when  parliament was dissolved  in  Decem-
ber  1995.  When  he  arranged  to  give  his  broadcast  on  Russian 
channels, these were jammed).  He  has  arranged for the  election 
of a puppet parliament, he disregards the decisions of the consti-
tutional court, and he  has totally manipulated elections and  refer-
enda.  Demonstrators and  opposition  leaders have been  arrested 
and  imprisoned.  A General  is  appointed  to  head  the  Ministry  of 
Defence,  according  to  old-style  Soviet  practice.  Currently  he  is 
trying  to  control  the  NGO  sector,  especially youth  organisations 
and humanitarian groups. 
The situation has parallels with  Kazakhstan where Nuzarbaev has 
recently  promulgated  a  new  constitution  which  is  described  as 
"Presidential  Democracy"  and  which  gives  great  power  to  the 
President. As  in  Belarus,  Nuzarbaev disregards the  decisions of 
the  constitutional  court.  He  has  created  a "mock  parliament"  in 
which there is only one known critic of the President. The media is 
totally dominated by the Government although it is possible to get 
access  to  Russian  media.  The  elections  have  been  fraudulent 
starting  with  the  original  election  of  Nuzarbaev  as  President  in 
1991  when  he was the only candidate." According to  the  election 
laws,  a potential  candidate  had  to  collect  100,000  signatures  in 
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eight weeks but this period was then restricted to  nine days. One 
interested  party  who  attempted  this  nonetheless,  was  attacked 
and  the  collected  signatures  were  stolen."  (Quoted  from  Back-
ground Study) 
The  situation  is  better in  Russia  and  Georgia.  In  both  countries 
the rule  of law is weak,  less because the government disregards 
the  law,  although  this  has  happened  on  occasion  in  both  coun-
tries but not systematically as in  Belarus and Kazakhstan. Rather 
it is  mainly because of widespread  criminality and  weak law en-
forcement  and/or justice.  The  separation  of  powers  is  not  fully 
established both because of the strong role  of the  President and 
because of the weakness of the judiciary.  In  both countries, fraud 
has been observed in elections but, except perhaps in the case of 
the  Russian  regional  elections,  this  has  not  been  sufficiently 
widespread to  nullify the results of the  elections.  Freedom of ex-
pression exists in  both  countries although the  television  is  state-
dominated  in  Georgia and  in  Russia  the  regional  press is  under 
the control of regional governors. Democratic control of the secu-
rity services is weak not so much because of the behaviour of the 
government. In  Russia, inadequate finance, failure to pay wages, 
and the  profound breakdown  of  morale  has  led  to  disintegration 
and privatisation of security. In Georgia, the police have consider-
able autonomy. 
In  all  nine  countries  we  studied,  there  are  weaknesses  in  sub-
stantive  democracy although  the  combination  of  weaknesses  is 
specific to  each  country.  It might be  possible  to  paraphrase Tol-
stoy's remark about happy and unhappy families.  Successful de-
mocracies are very similar; weak democracies are all weak in their 
own  individual ways.  The main  characteristics of substantive de-
mocracy in the nine countries are summarised in Table 4. All nine 
countries  in  varying  degrees  are  weak  in  the  implementation  of 
the rule of law.  In some cases, e.g.  Belarus, Kazakhstan and Slo-PTDP Evaluation Report  Evolution of Democracy 
vakia, this is because of government disregard for the rule of law. 
In other countries, reasons include the growth of criminality as the 
state  retreats  and  as  poverty and  inequality increase,  the  weak-
ness  of  law  enforcement  (often  because  of  lack  of  resources), 
and  the  weakness and /or arbitrariness of  the  judiciary both  be-
cause of inadequate resources and because of lack of independ-
ent legal traditions. In  most countries, there is a tendency towards 
clientilism,  patronage  and  corruption  in  the  administration  and 
most countries lack a public service ethos.  Reform  is proceeding 
in the Ph are countries, especially Poland and Hungary. 
Apart from the post-communist parties, political parties tend to be 
small  and  fragmented,  centred  around  an  individual  personality 
rather  than  an  ideology  or  philosophy.  In  the  Phare  countries, 
some consolidation is beginning to occur. The consolidation of the 
opposition parties in  Romania contributed to  their victory in  1996 
and  something  similar appears  to  be  happening  in  Slovakia.  In 
most countries the  electronic media is  dominated  or strongly in-
fluenced by the state although this is not true of Poland or Russia. 
There  are  serious  human  rights  violations  in  all  the  Tacis  coun-
tries mainly connected to the weakness of the rule of law. Torture 
in prisons is widespread in Russia and Belarus. The main problem 
in  Phare  countries  is  the  lack of  an  active  human  rights  policy. 
There  are  minority  problems  in  nearly  all  the  countries  except 
Poland  and  Kazakhstan.  Sexual  minorities  are  discriminated 
against in all the Tacis countries and in Romania. 
In  all  nine  countries,  there  is  a  tendency  to  centralise  power. 
There  are  active and  lively elected local governments in  Poland, 
Estonia  and  Hungary.  Local  autonomy  has  greatly  increased  in 
Romania since the elections. The main problems have to do with 
inadequate local finance and (often) the  existence of non-elected 
regional  tiers  of government between  the  local  and  the  national 
levels which restricts local autonomy. 
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The aspect of substantive democracy that is hardest and slowest 
to  achieve  is  a  democratic political  culture.  In  all  countries,  the 
collectivist authoritarian legacy of totalitarianism persists.  Distrust 
of politics, lack of confidence in  the  power of the individual, pas-
sivity,  apathy and  resignation  are  all  widespread.  Nevertheless, 
these  attitudes  are  changing  starting  with  the  urban  elite  and 
slowly spreading outwards. The  most striking and positive finding 
of our study is the growth of a substantial and active NGO sector 
in  all  countries and it can  be  argued that this can  make a signifi-
cant contribution to  changing political culture.  For this reason, the 
NGO sector is described at greater length in the next section. 
To sum up,  in  all the  nine countries,  except Belarus,  Kazakhstan 
and Slovakia, democracy is developing in  a positive direction de-
spite weaknesses and hiccoughs. This is summarised in  Table 5. 
In the case of Slovakia, there is a chance that the ruling party will 
Table 5: Development of Democracy overall Assessment 
Direction of  Comments 
development 
Estonia  71  unsolved problems with  Russian populati-
on 
Poland  1'  stable  development  towards  democratic 
society 
Slovakia  ~  potential for deterioration, 
new legislation on foundations 
Hungary  1'  stable  development  towards  democratic 
society 
Romania  1'  fast improvements since last elections 
Russia  71  improving, but unsolved problems 
(rule of law, democratic control of military) 
Georgia  71  conflict areas I war; rule of law 
Belarus  ~  autocratic presidential rule 
Kazakhstan  L!  autocratic presidential rule 
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be defeated in the next election which could dramatically change 
the situation as happened in  Romania.  After describing the  NGO 
sector in  greater detail, the  last section  will  summarise  our con-
clusions about the main ways in which Western governments and 
institutions may have contributed to  this positive development as 
a  background  to  a  consideration  of  the  specific  impact  of  the 
PTDP. 
2.2 The NGO Sector and Civil Society 
One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  the  post-communist 
transition is the rapid growth of a lively NGO sector. 
All post-communist countries saw a massive rise  in  the number of 
NGOs  of  different  types.  Table  6  summarises  the  information 
Table 6: Numbers of NGOs in Selected Countries 
Registered NGOs  Share outside capital city 
Belarus  3,000  Very few 
Estonia  6,000  Around 30% 
Georgia  2,500  Very few 
Hungary  50,000  n.a. 
Poland  45,000  80% 
Romania  12,000  75% 
Slovakia  15,000  Very High 
available  to  us  on  numbers  of  NGOs.  The  table  indicates  two 
significant  trends.  First,  those  countries  with  fewest  registered 
NGOs  also  tend  to  be  those  with  the  highest  concentration  of 
NGOs  in  capital  cities.  The  growth  in  the  number of  NGOs  ap-
pears to  be  associated with  the  tendency to  spread  beyond  the 
capital  cities.  Secondly,  there  appears  to  be  a  relationship  be-
tween  the  growth of the  number NGOs  and  the  evolution of de-
mocracy. Thus those  countries where formal democracy is firmly 
in  place and where substantive democracy is strongest have the (3) 
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largest numbers of NGOs. Thus Poland and Hungary have easily 
the largest NGO sectors, while the smallest numbers of NGOs are 
registered in Belarus and Georgia. 
The causal direction of this relationship needs to  be  investigated. 
Our hypothesis is that a set of virtuous and vicious circles can be 
identified. In those countries where democracy is most developed, 
NGOs enjoy more favourable conditions; they are  reported in  the 
media, they have access to political institutions and therefore they 
attract people. At the same time, the growth and spread of NGOs 
has a significant effect on political processes and public participa-
tion.  In  societies where  political  parties  are  weak  and  generally 
viewed  with  suspicion  because  of  the  legacy  of  communism, 
NGOs can  became the  mechanism for transmitting the  everyday 
concerns of ordinary people into the public arena and for spread-
ing  democratic  values.  On  the  other  hand,  in  situations  where 
democracy  is  weak  or  non-existent,  the  NGO  sector  is  tightly 
constrained.  Yet  at the  same  time,  the  NGO  sector is  of  crucial 
important to check authoritarian tendencies. 
Unfortunately, we  do  not have  figures  on  sources  of finance.  In 
general, East European NGOs are heavily dependent on Western 
sources of finance.  But it also seems to  be  the  case  that where 
there are  large numbers of NGOs,  there are  also  more possibili-
ties for internally generated resources, from individual donations, 
income-generating  activities  like  running  courses  and  seminars, 
the sale of publications and support from private enterprise. In the 
Polish  case,  an  interesting innovation is  the  annual prize offered 
by the municipalities of Gdansk and Donetsk (equivalent to  about 
4000 ECU) for the NGO voted to be the best in the town by other 
NGOs. 
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Theoretical reflections on the growth of NGOs 
The phenomenon of a growing importance of NGOs to some extent mirrors the developments in the 
West since the 1970s. Analysts in both East and West have struggled to explain this phenomenon 
and to ascertain its importance for the development of democracy. Both sides have approached the 
issue from a somewhat different angle, though  it  is  interesting to note how recent Western thought 
on  the development of  civil society and  its  importance for democracy was  influenced by the ideas 
and practices that came out of the Central European dissident movements in the-1980s. 
The dissident thinkers such as Havel, Michnik and Konrad emphasised the importance of civil soci-
ety based on  active citizenship as  a crucial defence mechanism against an  all  powerful state.  This 
needs to be understood in the context of the de-ideologisation of the real socialist state in the 1970s 
and  1980s where obedience but not  real  belief were required and where an  implicit social contract 
provided security of  work and relatively bearable standard of  living  in  exchange for obedience and 
apathy.  The demoralisation of these societies was  one  of  the central  issues tackled by the dissi-
dents. Rebuilt civil society in which the citizens actively expressed their values, beliefs and interests 
cut through the pretence game that the ·social contract' established. Pushing back the state from a 
variety of  social and  political spheres was  an  emancipatory strategy crucial for the regeneration  of 
these societies. 
The dissident movement and the dissident thinkers were not the only contributors to the civil society 
developments in the  East.  The  ossified but powerful  rule  of  communist party oligarchies and their 
suppression or neglect of issues affecting the daily lives of people stimulated a growth of groups of 
activists particularly among  the  young  (less  burdened by the past)  in  areas  such  as  the environ-
ment,  culture  and  peace.  The  environmental  movement  is  particularly interesting  as  the environ-
mental catastrophe in Central Europe could not be hidden from the inhabitants and the effect it had 
on  them  (declining health,  higher child mortality, etc.) made it  more difficult for the government to 
pretend that this is not something which is of legitimate interest to the people.  It is noteworthy that a 
number of people active in NGOs in Central Europe today were originally involved in environmental 
activities in the 1980s. 
There  is  little doubt that  Western  thinkers  were  influenced  by the  Eastern  developments  and  the 
growing contacts between the Eastern dissidents and Western peace movements for instance were 
an important factor in the growing popularisation of the concept of civil society. 
As noted above, the state is in retreat in both East and West. Nevertheless, it still remains a power-
ful  institution and the main source of  security for its citizens.  The state's impact on  the economy, 
real  and  potential,  is  not  negligible and  its political pre-eminence in  spite of  the emergence of  re-
gional  organisations  such  as  the  EU  is  still  relatively  unchallenged.  In  these  circumstances  the 
question of the power of the state in  relation to both the economy and civil society is crucial.  If the 
state is weakened to the extent that it cannot provide the kind of security that its citizens require and 
if  it  is  not  replaced  by some  regional  superstate the consequences  can  be disastrous to ordinary 
citizens as the experience in the Balkans would suggest.  A state that is too strong,  however,  stifles 
the economy and tends to be destructive of democracy. A right balance is  required and civil society 
plays a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance of this balance. 
The state also retains a powerful role in the post communist transition.  Privatisation for instance is 
not  unrelated to  clientelism  (Slovakia being  a good  example  of  this phenomenon)  and  corruption 
(affecting most). Powerful positions in  the state apparatus or in the government provide opportuni-
ties for enrichment not  just through  overt  corruption  but  also through  having  privileged access to 
information,  important contacts  and  even  capital.  A political  career in  some  of  the  new  fledgling 
parties could be a sound move towards establishing a basis for a good business. This phenomenon 
coupled with the persistent suspicion of political parties inherited from communism helps to explain 
why it  is civil society and the NGO sector that become the sources of  rules  of  social and political 
conduct that has an ethical content.  It can certainly be argued that this sector provides a better and 
more constructive training  ground for democratic public participation that  do the  political parties. 
And it is in this sense that it can be argued that civil society is  important not only because it  is the 
source of  underlying rules and limitation on  the power of  both the state and  potentially the market 
but  also that  in  contemporary  East  European  conditions  this  is  the  sector where  democrats  are 
trained and established. Crucially also the  development of  the  NGO  sector provides  an  important 
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The countries with the smallest numbers of NGOs also tend to be 
those with  low incomes.  In  particular,  educated  people  who  are 
the people most likely to  get involved  in  NGOs usually have  in-
adequate fixed salaries (in the Georgian case, an  average of $1_4 
a month).  It  is  therefore very difficult to  be  active  in  NGOs  on  a 
purely  voluntary  basis  because  of  the  need  to  seek  additional 
employment in order to survive; likewise, it is very difficult to raise 
funds internally.  It  is  sometimes argued,  therefore,  that many of 
the  NGOs  are  artificial,  established  for  economic  reasons  as  a 
form  of  employment  creation.  Our  impression  was  that  while 
NGOs  do  offer a way of  making  a living,  it  is  only those  active 
democratically minded people who choose this option, rather than 
say doing translations or starting a small business.  In  general we 
were  impressed by the  number of  committed  and  engaged  indi-
viduals that we met. 
The  ability  of  East  European  NGOs  to  attract  volunteers  is  un-
even.  Many of them do  not even  seek to  do  so  believing  that in 
circumstances where  most people are  preoccupied with  existen-
tial  matters  this  would  not  work.  There  are  others  that  are  top 
down  oriented  (transfers  of  knowledge,  skills,  etc.)  or  operate 
within  the  intellectual  elites  who  have  no  need  of  volunteers. 
However in most countries there are at least some who have suc-
cessfully  recruited  volunteers  and  are  beginning  to  establish  a 
basis for voluntary work as part of normal social activity. Another 
interesting  feature  is  that  in  most  of  these  countries  the  NGO 
sector is  predominantly staffed by  women.  This  is  worth  paying 
serious attention to as there is at least an  argument that this pro-
vides a basis for some long term redress of gender relations. 
NGOs working  in  the  field  of democracy,  citizenship and  human 
rights tend to be a small proportion of the total.  In those countries, 
where breakdowns of the types of  NGOs  are  available,  the  big-
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gest proportion of NGOs are usually cultural or religious organisa-
tions or groups concerned with  sport or other hobbies,  e.g.  gar-
dening.  Even  these  relatively  non-political  NGOs  do  affect  the 
political  culture  through  encouraging  self-organisation  and  a 
sense of individual empowerment.  Most NGOs are  very small al-
though  in  nearly  every  country,  larger,  more  visible  NGOs  with 
mass  membership  can  be  found.  Soldiers  Mothers  in  Russia 
which was formed during the Chechen conflict or the  Association 
of  Young  Lawyers  in  Georgia,  composed  of  committed  young 
lawyers who provide free legal advice and public education espe-
cially  in  human  rights,  are  both  examples  of  substantial,  indige-
nously  based  NGOs.  In  Kazakhstan,  Belarus, ·Russia,  and,  of 
course,  Poland,  independent trades  unions,  with  mass  member-
ship, are also very important. 
In  a number of countries, there are problems relating to  the legis-
lation  on  NGOs  and  the  tax  status.  In  several  countries,  for ex-
ample,  Georgia,  Poland,  Romania,  the  requisite  legislation  has 
not yet  been  passed.  In  some  countries,  for  example,  Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and  Russia,  registration procedures have been used 
to try to control the sector. This has been most extreme in Belarus 
where the government decided to  tax humanitarian activities and 
imposed  a  fine  of  $  3  mio  on  the  Sores  foundation  for  non-
payment  of  tax  which  led  to  its  closure.  In  Russia,  religious  or-
ganisations can  only  register  if  they  have  15  years  of  effective 
activity. Moreover, new NGOs have to give a certified copy of the 
passports  of  the  ten  founder  members  which  altogether  costs 
$600 in legal costs. In  Kazakhstan, a gay rights group was unable 
to apply for PTDP funding because it was not registered officially; 
this was  because the  Kazak authorities do  not recognise  homo-
sexuality. 
Certain useful distinctions which help in the assessment of these 
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one such distinction is between an established organisation and a 
looser form  of  association  more  akin  to  a social  movement and 
related to that between those that stress growing professionalism 
as against those who stress social engagement. Other useful dis-
tinctions  are  between  policy  oriented  NGOs  and  non-policy  ori-
ented  NGOs  (Carothers,  1996),  between  service  providers  and 
civil  advocacy groups, and between those concerned with  creat-
ing  specific  outcomes  and  those  concerned  with  developing 
specific processes.  These  distinctions  should  make  it  clear  that 
the  same  measurement  of  success  cannot  be  applied  to  all  of 
them.  Whereas  service  providers  can  be  judged  by  whether  a 
particular service  has actually been  delivered  and  at what  cost, 
social advocacy groups cannot be judged in  the  same way,  par-
ticularly those  whose  main  concern  is  with  changing  public  atti-
tudes.  The  latter  are  engaged  in  a  slow  long  term  process  in 
which  advances  are  not  easily  ascertained  and  where  only  a 
qualitative judgement can  be  made  as  to  the  importance  of this 
work.  The  distinction  is  also  important for the  financing  of such 
groups  and  particularly for establishing  their financial  independ-
ence. Service providers have some advantages over social advo-
cacy groups in this context. The former are much more likely to be 
able to successfully appeal to the domestic funders and to devel-
oping self-financing potential involving sale of services, expertise, 
etc. than the social advocacy groups. 
Many types of NGO are necessary for a healthy NGO sector. Co-
operation  between  the  more  professionalised  output  oriented 
NGOs and the more movement type of process oriented NGOs is 
very  important.  The  former  provide  advice,  training  and  other 
types of assistance to the latter; while the latter are more likely to 
set the political agenda and attract new recruits. 
An important issue confronting  NGOs is what kind of relationship 
they should  have  with  the  government.  Given  the  origins  of the 
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NGO sector in  Eastern Europe it is not surprising that particularly 
the social advocacy groups tend to perceive the government with 
some  suspicion  as  at  least  a  potential  enemy.  It  is  also  to  be 
noted that a number of  t~e post-communist governments treated 
the  NGO  sector with  suspicion  and  hostility too  or worse,  some 
because  they  perceived  this  sector  as  a  threat  to  its  power 
(Belarus,  Kazakhstan  and  to  a  lesser extent  Slovakia,  and  Ro-
mania before November 1996) and some because they perceived 
the  NGO sector as  a threat to  representative democracy (Czech 
Republic). Curiously in some sense hostility from the government 
made  life easier. Cooperation was sought from  other NGOs  and 
the  government was  to  be  opposed  (Slovakia  and  Belarus).  In 
circumstances when  the  government is  sympathetic towards the 
NGO sector a more complex policy is required which combines a 
degree of partnership with  a degree of monitoring and pressure. 
The  development of such  a partnership  is  not an  easy process 
and takes both sides considerable time to develop the necessary 
practices and  rules of the game (Hungary and  now Romania are 
interesting examples). 
This question is probably the most contested issue among NGOs 
in  Russia, especially since summer 1996, when  President Yeltsin 
officially declared 1998 the  year of human  rights.  He  decided to 
support human  rights  activities and  to  create  a "public-state  hu-
man  right  commission"  in  each  region.  The  very  term  sounds 
strange in  Russian as society and state were always very cut off 
from  one  another.  The  question  is  "is  it possible  to  work with  a 
state that violates human rights?".  For some  NGOs and activists, 
the  answer is  categorically  no,  but these  are  very  few  and  are 
victims  of the  state structures  and  security services (like  Nikitin, 
Padalko in  Irkutsk, and some  in  Magadan, Omsk,  Arkhangelsk in 
the last few months where there have been cases of false arrest 
and imprisonment). PTOP Evaluation Report  Evolution of Democracy 
NGOs  unlike  political  parties  do  not  necessarily  seek  public 
popularity  and  are  therefore  more  likely  to  raise  and  advocate 
relatively unpopular issues such as feminism, gay rights, abolition 
of capital punishment and so on.  In  any democracy this is  impor-
tant but in the post-communist countries with their long authoritar-
ian traditions, relative absence of tolerance and low levels of pub-
lic debate this is crucial. 
An  important characteristic of the growing NGO sector is  its tran-
snational character. This is partly because of external finance and 
partly  because  of  an  increasing  number  of  partnerships  with 
NGOs in  other countries both  East and West. This is  a relatively 
recent phenomenon that can be associated with globalisation and 
the increased opportunities for transnational communication. The 
transnational character of some parts of the  NGO sector helps to 
promote  an  internationalist  outlook  and  contributes  to  interna-
tional integration at a societal level. 
2.3 The Role of Western Governments and Institutions 
Western governments and  institutions have played a crucial  role 
in the development of democracy in  Central and  Eastern Europe. 
Most obviously, Western democracies have offered a model to be 
emulated at least in some degree. Moreover, the new ruling elites 
are,  in  general,  concerned  about how their country  is  perceived 
internationally and this influences their behaviour. In policy terms , 
there  have been  three  ways  in  which  Western  institutions have 
influenced the evolution of democracy. 
First of all, Western governments have exerted pressure on  gov-
ernments in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  to  adopt reforms.  This 
has taken several forms:  the promise of membership in  Western 
institutions should the prerequisites of formal democracy be  met; 
conditionality  attached  to  economic  assistance;  and  moral  sua-
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sion. Thus it was the lure of NATO membership which persuaded 
the  Hungarian government to  drop the demand for ethnic auton-
omy for Hungarians in Transylvania; this made possible the  Hun-
garian-Romanian  Treaty  which  has  enormously  improved  rela-
tions  between  Romanians  and  Hungarians  in  Romania.  It  was 
also Western pressure that led to  the  reopening  of  Rustaveni-2, 
the  only  private  television  station  in  Georgia  which  had  been 
closed down by the  Government. The abolition of capital punish-
ment, the legalisation of homosexuality are all examples of meas-
ures taken to comply with the demands of the Council of Europe. 
Western  policy  is  not,  of  course,  always  favourable  for democ-
racy.  In some cases, Western governments have chosen to  sup-
port certain leaders despite infringements of democracy because 
these leaders are viewed as the best hope for stability. Examples 
include the failure to  criticise  Russian policy in  Chechnya or con-
tinued support for Berisha in  Albania after gross electoral irregu-
larities. NGOs offer an  important counterweight to this kind of ap-
proach. They draw attention  to  infringements of democracy and 
they represent potentially an alternative societal form of stability. 
Secondly,  Western  assistance  in  general has  contributed  to  the 
reform  process,  in  particular,  assistance for public administration 
or education. The  role  of economic reform  is  more  controversial. 
On  the  one  hand,  liberalisation opens up space  for independent 
economic  initiatives  and  reduces  the  overwhelming  weight  of 
state activity in society. On  the other hand, economic reform has 
also  contributed  to  poverty,  inequality and  the  transformation  of 
former nomenclature into the new rich; this has often led to disil-
lusion with democracy. More investigation is needed to assess the 
impact of  economic assistance on  politics and the ways in  which 
such assistance could be better designed to contribute to democ-
racy goals. PTDP Evaluation Report  Evolution of Democracy 
Thirdly,  Western  countries  have  provided  considerable  amounts 
of democracy assistance  since  1989  Democracy  assistance  be-
gan in the 1980s with the transitions to democracy in  Latin Amer-
ica and Africa although German party foundations had  been  ac-
tive  earlier  in  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece·.  Major public donors 
were the US, Sweden and the Netherlands. Assistance to Central 
and Eastern Europe began after 1989. The exact amounts of de-
mocracy assistance are  rather difficult to  calculate  because they 
appear under different headings in aid budgets. Quigley suggests 
that US AID provided some $339 million in democracy assistance 
to  Central  Europe  between  1989  and  1993.  In  addition,  inde-
pendent  foundations  provided  a  further  $450  million  upwards 
(Quigley  1996).  Extrapolating from  these  figures,  it seems  likely 
that total democracy assistance from  both  private  and  public do-
nors  to  Phare  and  Tacis  countries  was  upwards  of  $  2  billion 
since 1989. 
In  this context, EU  spending on  democracy has been  a relatively 
small proportion of the total. As well as the PTDP, there are other 
budget lines  in  Phare  and  Tacis  which  are  directly  or indirectly 
linked to the development of a civil society.  It is impossible to  ex-
tract from the national budgets exactly how much  is related to the 
d~velopment  of  democracy.  However,  a  simple  comparison 
shows that under several technical assistance titles a much larger 
amount is  spent than  under the  PTDP.  For policy  advice  Tacis 
has  spent 86.88  mio  ECU  between  1991  and  1995,  for public 
administration  reform,  social  service  and  education  388.14  mio 
ECU. Under Phare 233.9 mio ECU has been spent for public insti-
tutions and  administrative reform between  1990 and  1995. Even 
including these different budget headings, the totals are  re_latively 
small. 
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Private  foundations,  particularly  American  foundations,  have 
played a pioneering role in democracy assistance. They are much 
more flexible than  public donors and  are  able to  offer assistance 
rapidly  without  burdensome  technical  requirements.  Often  the 
private foundations provide the initial funding that allows NGOs to 
learn the techniques that enables them to go on to apply for pub-
lic  funding.  In  particular,  the  Sores  family  of  foundations  have 
played  a key  role  in  most  Central  and  Eastern  European  coun-
tries.  The  amounts  provided  have  been  much  greater than  that 
provided by most public institutions including the European Union. 
Studies  of  democracy assistance  all  suggest that the  major im-
pact  of  such  assistance  is  the  creation  of  an  NGO  sector. 
(Quigley 1996, Carothers  1996,  Robinson,  1996). These studies 
also  suggest  that  such  assistance  is  most  effective  where  the 
recipients  are  already  committed  and  engaged.  Very  few  artifi-
cially  created  NGOs  survive,  although  one  good  example  is  the 
Society for Fair Elections  in  Georgia,  which  was  established  by 
the  US government funded  National Endowment for Democracy. 
Likewise training programmes and seminars are only useful in  so 
far as the  participants are  keen  to  make  use  of what they learn. 
This  is  why  familiarity with  the  local  situation  is  more  important 
when making grants than the quality of formal grant applications. 
Support to the NGO sector has been important in part for the rea-
sons  given  above  - the  role  of  NGOs  in  spreading  democratic 
ideas and values and  in  preventing  a reversion  to  authoritarian-
ism.  It  is  also  important  because  NGOs  draw  attention  to  the 
weaknesses of the  democratisation process  and  represent a re-
pository of knowledge about the specificities of their society which 
can  be  used by the donors, for example, to put pressure on gov-
ernments.  There  is  a tendency for policy-makers  and  experts  to 
rely  on  top-down  information  which  always  tends  to  conceal 
weaknesses  and  makes  it difficult to  anticipate  change.  One  of PTDP Evaluation Report  Evolution of Democracy 
the main reason for the unpreparedness of governments and so-
cial scientists for the 1989 elections was their preoccupation with 
the behaviour of ruling elites. NGOs offer a critical way of monitor-
ing the  progress towards democracy.  Moreover through  commu-
nication  with  Western  partners they  are  able  to  make  this  infor-
mation publicly available both in the West and domestically. 
From  the  point of  view  of  the  recipients,  Western  assistance  is 
important  not  just  because  of  the  provision  of  money.  On  the 
contrary, most recipients stress the  importance of  moral support, 
the sense of empowerment offered by the  knowledge that West-
ern  donors recognise  the  worth  of their activities.  A point that is 
emphasised by Carothers is the subjective way in  which  democ-
racy is viewed in  Eastern Europe. Whereas, Western donors tend 
to  like  concrete  measurable  and  visible  outcomes  which  can 
demonstrate the  cost-effectiveness  of  their programmes,  the  re-
cipients tend to see democracy in terms of its impact on  personal 
development.  In  several  of  the  roundtables,  we  were  struck  by 
this kind of personal interpretation of democracy. Democracy was 
seen  in  terms  of  a  widening  of  horizons  and  opportunities,  as 
giving individual citizens a sense of dignity even  if this is  not re-
spected, of learning how to act and think as an  individual and not 
as a member of a collectivity, of taking personal responsibility for 
life choices. 
Two  other aspects of democracy assistance are  also  considered 
important. One is the learning process, not just the formal training 
programmes but the experience of applying for funds; carrying out 
a project,  writing  a report.  In  this  respect,  partnerships  are  very 
important. The  other is the  protection  provided by Western  sup-
port.  Precisely because governments are  concerned  about their 
international image, they are hesitant to  oppose, crack down on, 
or repress organisations supported by prominent Western donors. 
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In  the  context of  overall  Western  democracy assistance  and  in-
deed other EU budget lines,  it is  rather difficult to  distinguish the 
specific impact of the  PTDP  on  the  development of democracy. 
We have tried to  do this by studying the  concrete content of the 
programme.  Our conclusions  are  summarised  in  the  rest  of  this 
report. PTDP Evaluation Reoort Stratistical Ovewiar
3. Quantitative lmpact of the PTDP
3.1 Overall Statlstlcs on PTDP
For 1992 the Phare Democracy Programme  had a budget of 5
mio ECU. For the years from 1993 to 1996 the Phare and Tacis
Democracy Programme had an overall budget line of 76 mio
ECUl. Over the whole period 59% of these budgets was spent on
projects within the Phare Programme, leaving 41o/" for the Tacis
Programme. This disproportion is due to Phare having begun ea'-
lier. In 1993 the Phare budget amounted to 1 1 mio ECU, as com-
pared to the four mio ECU of the 1993 Tacis budget. In the follow-
ing years, however, both Programmes were equipped with the
same budget lines of 10 mio ECU each in 1994 and 1995 and 1 1
mio in 1996. J'r"ruS, in view of the project contracts that have been
1 The following quantitative evaluation will cover only the budget years
1993 to 1996. Projects financed under the budget year 1992 are rpt
irrcluded.  Their data is in some respects - for example with regard to
the areas of activity - inconsistent with those ol the following years.
Grentl 199$1996 undcr Pharc and Teclr
pc Budgct Ycrr end Typc ol Profcct
(Graphlc 1)
2(xl00
175m
15000
Grentr In 125m
Thourand lqxn
ECU  7s(n
5m0
2s00
0
1903
E]l]lTrclc  lllcro
ElTedr llrcro Profcctr
l@Taclr Ad-hoc Profcclr
+-All  Profcctr
1995 1996
@l  Pfrerc lllcro Prolcctr
IPharc  llacro Profcctr
I  Pharc Ad-hoc  Prof cc'tr
^ ^
--^
+tr
I
? D rdk
=
33Statistical Overviqv PTDP Evaluaim Report
concluded under these budgets the Phare and the Tacis Democ-
racy Programmes  have been generally of the same size since
rc942.
The greatest part of the Phare and Tacis budgets from 1993 to
1996 has been spent on macro-projects. With a total amount of
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more than 47 mto ECU the macro-projects made up aboutT}%  ot
the Democracy Programmes. However, ad-hoc projects
amounted to more than 12 mio ECU, or nearly 20% of the Pro-
gramme's budget.7.4 mio ECU has been spent on micro-proiects,
which until 1995 have been financed only under the Phare Pro-
gramme. This meant the share of micro-proiects in the Phare and
Tacis Democracy Programme  from 1993 to 1996 was 11"/o.3
The statistics are based on the amount of contracts that have been
concluded  lor projects in the Phare and Tacis counlries. The statistics
therefore do not include budgets for the management  of the PTDP
nor do they include the factor of project failures.
Tacis micro-project budgets had been assigned to some countries but
had not been spent by June 1997.
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The  PTDP's  funding  of  macro-projects  concentrated  on  a  few 
Areas of Activity. The Development of NGOs received the largest 
share of the  budget; more  than  20  mio  ECU  has been  spent on 
macro-projects for the Development of NGOs and Representative 
Structures, accounting for nearly half of the  macro-project budget 
from 1993 to  1996. Eight mio ECU was spent on  Awareness Buil-
ding and Education which accounted for almost 15°/o of the  total. 
The  two  Areas of Activity - Independent,  Pluralistic and  Respon-
sible  Media and  Promoting  and  Monitoring Human  Rights  - each 
accounted for about 5 mio  ECU or 1  0°/o  of the  total. The remain-
ing 20°/o  of the macro-project budget has been  used for projects 
in  the  other Areas  of  Activity,  namely  Public  Administration,  Mi-
nority  Rights  and  Equal  Opportunity;  Security  Structures;  and 
Parliamentary Practice. 
3.2 The Phare Countries 
The  importance  of  macro-projects  in  the  Phare  Democracy  Pro-
gramme is very clear. With 26 mio  ECU devoted to  them,  macro-
project  contracts  made  up  almost  three  quarters  of  the  Phare 
budget.  Micro-projects  have  had  a significant  part  in  the  Phare 
Programme.  Nearly 7 mio  ECU  has been  spent for Phare  micro-
projects, making up almost 20°/o of the Ph are budget. The ad-hoc-
project scheme has amounted to  only 1  0°/o  or almost 3 mio  ECU 
of the Phare budget. 
The quantitatively significant role of the micro-project scheme and 
the  lesser significance  of  ad-hoc-projects  within  the  Phare  Pro-
gramme has been a constant feature of each  of the  years under 
review,  and  indeed  the  difference  between  these  two  types  of 
projects increased during the last three years.  Since  1994, when 
the  first  ad-hoc-projects  were  initiated  under  the  Phare  Pro-
gramme, the share of ad-hoc-projects has been  continuously re-
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duced in relation to the micro and macro-project schemes. While
in 1994 the ad-hoc-project contracts of 1 .3 mio ECU amounted to
almost the same as the budget for micro-projects (1.8 mio ECU)
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and a quarter of the budget for macro-proiects (5.6 mio ECU), the
ad-hoc-projects in the 1996 budget year only accounted for 0.4
mio ECU, that is to say, only 20/" of the budget for micro-projects
(2.1 mio ECU) and 6o/o ol the budget for macro-projects (6.5 mio
ECU).
3.2.1 Project Countries
The distribution of project grants among the 11 Phare countries
indicates that they all have been involved in the Phare Pro-
gramme's activities. Viewed in terms of the macro-project grants,
Pofand had the highest share of the Phare Programme.  1 8"/o ol
the Phare macro-proiect grants was spent on projects in Poland.
Poland is followed by the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and
Bulgaria, each of which received  1 1-13% of macro-projects
grants. 9% was spent on projects in the Slovak Republic.  The
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remaining  Phare  countries of Albania,  Estonia,  Lithuania,  Slove-
nia and Latvia, had a share of 4°/o to 6°/o each. 
The  distribution  of  macro-project  grants  in  general  reflects  the 
different population  sizes  in  the  Phare  countries.  Only  Poland, 
despite its leading rank in view of absolute figures, and Romania, 
have had a share of  macro-projects lower,  in  relation  to the  size 
of  their  population,  than  that  of  the  other  countries4.  Poland's 
share  of  macro-projects  has  continuously  declined  since  1993. 
Similarly,  Romania  and  Hungary  could  not  retain  their  starting 
share in  1993, which was  nearly as  large  as  that of  Poland.  On 
the other hand, grants for macro-projects in Bulgaria have steadily 
increased  over the  years.  In  1996 they by far  outnumbered  the 
share in each of the other Phare countries. 
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4  This finding,  however,  has to be mitigated by the fact  that  in total 
projects grants have been evenly ascribed to the participating coun-
tries in our statistics. However, it can be reasonably assumed that in 
fact larger countries, such as Poland and Romania, often received a 
larger share of project grants than smaller countries, such as Estonia. 
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The  share  of  the  micro-project budgets,  which  is  determined by 
the  national budget lines fixed  by the  European  Commission,  is 
generally  in  line  with  the  distribution  of  macro-project  grants 
among the Phare countries. Significant exceptions here, however, 
apply to the  Czech  Republic and  Romania. While the Czech  Re-
public has  had  a micro-project line  (7°/o)  which  was  much  lower 
than  its share of  the  macro-project budget (13°/o),  Romania's mi-
cro-project line (21 °/o)  was well above the level of its participation 
in the macro-project scheme (12°/o). 
3.2.2 Areas of  Activity 
The  distribution of the  macro-project grants among the  eight Ar-
eas  of  Activity  by  and  large  follows  the  general  pattern  of  the 
PTDP.  One  important  difference  is  most  of  the  micro-projects 
(35°/o)  concentrate their activity on  Awareness  Building while  the 
Development  of  NGOs  is  only  the  second  most  often  selected 
subject (22°/o).  The third most selected Area of Activity in  the  mi-
cro-project  scheme  is  Minority  Rights  and  Equal  Opportunity, 
which has a share of 12°/o  in  the  micro-project scheme compared 
with 7°/o in the Phare macro-project scheme. 
3.3 The Tacis Countries 
As  in  the  Phare  Programme,  two  thirds of the  Tacis budget has 
been spent on  macro-projects.  In  contrast to Phare, however, the 
remaining  one  third  has  not  been  used  for  the  micro-project 
scheme, but has been almost entirely confined to ad-hoc-projects. 
At a total amount of almost 10 mio  ECU, ad-hoc-projects come to 
more than 30°/o of the Tacis Programme. This is far more than the 
share of ad-hoc-projects in  Phare  (2.942 mio  ECU  and  less than 
1  0°/o).  Micro-projects  were  only  introduced  (0.5  mio  ECU)  into PTDP Evaluation Report Statisdcal Orrcwiew
Tacis in the 1996 budget year. They are less than 2o/o of the Tacis
budget, and were still not in place in early 1997.
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3.3.1 Project Countries
The 13 Tacis Countries are of extremely different sizes in terms of
their population, ranging from 150 mio in Russia to 2.3 mio in
Mongolia. Accordingly, proiect grants have been distributed heav-
ily unequally.  Projects in the Russian Federation received almost
half of the whole Tacis budget from 1993 to 19965. Projects in the
Ukraine received another large proportion, nearly 20o/o, of the
Tacis macro-proiect grants, followed by Belarus and Georgia with
about 7o/o e?ch. The remainine 20o/o or so are distributed  among
the other nine Tacis countries, namely Kyrgistan, Kazakhstan,
Moldavia,  Mongolia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan
and finally Turkmenistan,  their shares ranging from 4o/o lo under
1o/o. In relation to their population, however, only in Uzbekistan
5 This amount can be expected  to be even higher: see footnote no. 3.
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and Kazakhstan is the amount of macro-project grants clearly too 
small. 
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The  dominant  role  of  the  Russian  Federation  and  Ukraine  has 
increased  continuously  over the  years  and  has  been  accompa-
nied by a steady decline of regional  integration. Whereas the  re-
lation of national and multinational macro-projects has been even 
and  relatively  constant  in  the  Phare  Programme,  Tacis  national 
projects  amounted  to  70°/o  of  the  total,  leaving  only 30°/o  of the 
project grants to  multinational macro-projects. And this dispropor-
tion  has  continually  increased.  Multinational  projects  came  to 
.about 60°/o  when  compared to  national projects in  1993.  In  1996 
they were  only 30°/o  of national  macro-projects,  with  most being 
projects in the Russian Federation. 
3.3.2 Areas of  Activity 
The distribution of macro-project grants among the eight Areas of 
Activity is generally congruent with  that of the  whole  PTDP.  De-PTDP Evaluation Report  Statistical Overview 
velopment of NGOs has had a predominant position with a share 
of  nearly  50°/o,  followed  by  Awareness  Building,  Independent 
Media and  Human  Rights, each  of which amounted to  12°/o-13°/o. 
The remaining Areas make up  3°/o-5°/~ each. Only the Area Minor-
ity Rights and  Equal Opportunity, with  a 1  °/o  share, has been vir-
tually unrepresented within  the  Tacis  Programme; this compared 
with  a  7°/o  share  in  the  Phare  macro  scheme  and  12°/o  in  the 
Ph are micro scheme. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Based  on  our quantitative  analysis  of  the  PTDP  we  can  draw 
several  conclusions  on  the  programme  implementation,  distribu-
tion  over  countries  and  acceptance  in  specific  areas  of  pro-
gramme activities. 
1. There are  major differences between the  Phare and the Tacis 
part of the programme. The  Phare part is  dominated by the bot-
tom  up  approach,  favouring  macro-projects  which  are  more  or 
less equally distributed among all countries and which -to a large 
degree- involve multi-country activities. In addition, under Phare a 
micro-project approach  which  is  also  'bottom  up'  has  been  suc-
cessfully introduced. The  Ad  hoc/Own  initiative projects do exist, 
but never had  a dominant influence.  They  are  used  in  special, 
defined areas. 
2.  The Tacis part of the  programme  has  a strong  impact on  ad 
hoc/ own  initiative  projects,  covering  a broader  range  of  areas. 
Micro-projects are still not in  operation, although the budgets are 
partly available for 1997. The Tacis macro-projects are to  a large 
degree  concentrated  on  Russia  and  Ukraine  and  are  not  very 
multi national in their approach. The greater importance of ad hoc 
projects  has  influenced  the  areas  of  activities  under PTDP.  Ad 
hoc  projects  mainly  exist  in  areas  like  parliamentary  practice, 
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election support and rule  of law, areas which play a minor role  in 
a bottom up approach. 
3.  The  statistical  distribution  of  projects  over the  eight areas  of 
activity show a clear dominance of the development of NGOs as 
a main aspect of the programme both in  Phare and in  Tacis. The 
ranking is: 
•  Development of NGOs (46°/o) 
•  Awareness building (14°/o) 
•  Independent Media (1 0°/o) 
•  Human Rights (1 0°/o). 
These four areas account for 80°/o  of all projects. Even  if the dis-
tribution over all eight areas is a little bit more even under Phare, 
the dominant share of NGO development remains significant. The 
instrument of bottom up initiated macro-projects run by NGOs and 
the special political situation  in  transformation states set limits to 
which the eight areas of activities can be realised. 
4.  In several Tacis countries some areas of activity are completely 
missing,  e.g.  parliamentary  practice.  The  distribution  of  micro-
projects over areas of activity under Phare shows that critical ar-
eas  like  minority  rights,  public  administration  play statistically  a 
larger role than under the macro facility scheme. If there is truth in 
the  argument  that  NGOs  learn  to  manage  larger projects  from 
managing smaller ones,  the  non-existence of  micro-project facili-
ties in Tacis countries is harming the success of the PTDP. 
5.  Analysing specific countries,  the  distribution  of projects partly 
reflects the size  of the countries. This  is  true for Russia and the 
Tacis  countries.  Under  Phare  the  projects  are  distributed  more 
equally over all countries, which leaves comparatively large coun-
tries like Poland in a less favourable position. However, the distri-
bution over countries does not seem to  reflect any specific politi-
cal situation or main focus for single countries. PTDP Evaluation Report  Statistical Overview 
6.  For Phare the  PTDP  is  represented by at least one  project in 
each  area of  activity in  each  country. The Tacis programme  has 
many more gaps in most countries, which can be explained by the 
fact that PTDP is still in a process of advertising and establishing 
itself  in  these  countries  and  the  NGO  sector is  less well  devel-
oped. 
7. The development of total grants for each country is very differ-
ent, which seems natural with the bottom up  approach of macro-
projects.  For  the  nine  countries  we  have  evaluated  there  are 
growing  budgets  for  Estonia,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan  and  Russia, 
and decreasing budgets for Hungary, Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia 
and  Belarus.  However, a period of four years is  not long enough 
to permit more than a tentative generalisation. 
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4.  Qualitative Impact of PTDP in Evaluated Countries 
4.1  Evaluation Framework 
The following chapter summarises our overall findings concerning 
the qualitative  impact of the PTDP. These findings are based on: 
- evaluations of 65 projects including 3 ad hoc projects, 41  macro-
projects and  21  micro projects using interviews, project reports 
and monitoring reports 
- 1  0 round tables in  the  nine selected countries,  including two  in 
Russia 
- interviews  with  individuals  involved  in  the  PTDP  including  the 
Commission, the  local EU delegations and  Phare and Tacis of-
fices, the European Human Rights Foundation 
- interviews with other donors, e.g. Soros or the Know-How Fund, 
independent experts and NGOs  not supported by the PTDP. 
We have assessed the projects according to the criteria set out in 
Chapter 1 (p.  6/7).  In this chapter, we summarise our conclusions 
for each  criterion.  A more detailed description by country is  con-
tained in the annex to this report. 
Evaluation Criteria 
Relevance:  the  extent  to  which  the  PTDP  addressed  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of democracy in each country. 
Consistency: the extent to which  projects  are consistent  with  guidelines  of 
PTDP and their own project proposals. 
Efficiency: whether projects have been implemented efficiently. 
Adequacy of procedures: the extent to which the operational guidelines and 
practices are adequate. 
Impact: contributions of  PTDP to the development of  democracy. Analysed 
as impact on individuals, groups, networks and politics. 
Visibility: Visibility of projects, PTDP and the EU. 
Replicability:  to  what  extent  did  projects  contribute  to  institution  building 
which will enable similar projects in the future. 
Sustainability: ability to continue the project after initial funding. 
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Given the character of the PTDP, it is not possible to measure the 
cost-effectiveness  of  individual  projects  or  programmes,  as  we 
emphasise  in  the  first  chapter.  By  combining  these  evaluation 
criteria,  however,  we  are_ able  to  make some  overall judgements 
about  the  political  impact  of  the  programme  and  the  separate 
components of the  programme.  This  combination  is  summarised 
in Table 7 at the end of this chapter. 
4.2  Relevance 
By relevance, we  mean the extent to which the  PTDP  addressed 
the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  democracy  as  outlined  in 
Chapter 2. 
In  all  the  Tacis  countries  there  are  deficits  in  formal  democratic 
procedures.  By  and  large,  the  top-down  ad  hoc  projects  are 
largely  designed  to  correct  weaknesses  in  formal  democracy. 
Therefore,  the  relative  emphasis on  ad  hoc projects was  clearly 
relevant;  a  much  higher  proportion  of  the  total  assistance  pro-
gramme consisted of ad  hoc projects in  these countries as is the 
case  in  Phare countries. The  largest share of the ad  hoc budget 
for Tacis countries, just over a quarter of the total,  was spent on 
joint programmes with the Council of Europe designed to improve 
the quality of the participation of these countries in  the Council of 
Europe.  These  programmes  included  assistance  in  preparing 
legislation, such as the Convention on torture, in accordance with 
European norms, training of judges, as  well  as  assistance to  im-
prove  the  implementation  of  human  rights.  The  second  largest 
share, almost 20°/o was spent on parliamentary practise and some 
16°/o  was  spent on  election  monitoring,  often  in  conjunction  with 
other international institutions, e.g. the OSCE. The remainder was 
spent on media monitoring before and during elections, training of 
journalists, support for legal development and  civic education.  In PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
particular,  the  innovative  media  monitoring  project  was  clearly 
relevant in  countries where lack of a pluralistic media is a key ob-
stacle to free and fair elections. 
In  the  Phare  countries,  the  ad  hoc  projects  are  less  important. 
Those  ad  hoc  projects  concerned  with  minorities  and  with  anti-
corruption  were  clearly  relevant  to  the  problems  faced  in  all  the 
Phare countries, especially Estonia, Romania and Slovakia. 
Regional Roma Programme 
Under the  1994  Ad  Hoc  facility  for  Phare  a  regional  Roma  programme  was 
funded in Hungary. The contractor was the Autonomia Foundation, which devel-
oped through this and other projects into a very influential and  stable institution 
in Hungary. 
The  project  had  three  components:  leadership  and  management  training,  the 
training of radio journalists and the establishment of legal defence bureaux. 
The leadership training took place over three modules separated in time; the aim 
was  to  address  the  complexes  that  arise  from  the  tendency  to  accept  self-
images created by others because  of inadequate history and lack of pride. Many 
of  those  trained  have  now  established  themselves  as  Roma  leaders  in  their 
villages. 
The radio training was especially successful in Bulgaria where local Roma radio 
broadcasts have been  started in  six places.  Roma journalists who  were trained 
under the programme won  a prize for the  best  production  dialogue with  local 
people. 
The legal defence bureaux were replicated.  Initially, two were created in Bulgaria 
and Hungary. Then  two more were created  in  Bulgaria and  Slovakia.  The  Bul-
garians assisted in the establishment of the Romanian bureau and the Hungari-
ans in the establishment of the Slovak bureau. 
This project was very relevant.  It drew attention to an  important emerging issue 
in  Central  Europe.  It  helped  to  create  a  Roma  network  and  mechanisms  for 
Roma representation and defence at  a time when  discrimination against Roma 
is growing. The multi-country character of the project was also important. 
As far as the macro- and the micro-projects are concerned, in  all 
countries, the predominant emphasis was on  the development of 
the  NGO sector and  awareness-building  and  civic  education.  By 
and  large,  the  balance  of  projects  in  different  countries  does 
seem  to  have  reflected  the  specific  needs  in  those  countries. 
Democratic reform,  human  rights  and  penal  reform  have  all  re-
ceived emphasis in Belarus. Human rights have received greatest 
prioritisation in  Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan.  In  Russia,  more 
is  devoted to  the  monitoring  of  security  structures  than  in  other 
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countries. Hungary and Poland have received relatively more than 
other countries for transparency of  public administration.  The  in-
dependent media have  received  emphasis  in  Georgia,  Romania 
and Poland. The priority given to minority issues and/or disadvan-
taged  groups  in  Kazakhstan,  Romania  and  Slovakia  is  also  ap-
propriate.  Indeed,  in  only one  case,  Estonia, where greater em-
phasis  could  have  been  accorded  to  the  status  of  the  Russian 
minority, is the  relevance of the  choice of projects open to ques-
tion. 
Analysis  of  the  programme  by  areas  of  activity  does  not  fully 
capture  the  priorities  of  the  programme,  however,  since  many 
projects cover a number of different areas and/or do not exactly fit 
any one of the defined areas.  Thus  conflict resolution  and  confi-
dence building measures in  conflict areas were an  important and 
highly relevant component of the programme in  Georgia although 
the  projects were  categorised  as  NGO development,  awareness 
building and independent media. Similarly projects aimed at solv-
ing  social  problems  and  representing  marginalised  groups  or 
special interest groups are a relatively important component of the 
overall  programme.  Thus  trade  unions  have  been  supported  in 
Belarus,  Russia and  Georgia; the  association  of  landowners and 
agricultural entrepreneurs in  Slovakia,  disabled  groups  in  Slova-
kia,  prisoners in  Romania,  and projects aimed at poverty allevia-
tion in Kazakhstan. Womens groups have also received priority in 
most countries.  These  projects  come  under  NGO  development, 
awareness-building  and  minorities  and  disadvantaged  groups. 
Thus the category for minorities and disadvantaged groups is, like 
NGO  development,  somewhat  of  a  holdall  category  which  in-
cludes projects aimed  at coping  with  ethnic problems - Hungari-
ans and Slovaks in Slovakia, refugee projects in  Poland, or Roma 
projects in  several countries- as  well  as social issues, gender is-
sues and sexual minorities. PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
Conflict Resolution In Georgia 
A major obstacle to democracy in the  Transcaucasus region  is the continua-
tion  of  unsolved or frozen  conflicts,  in  particular - Abkhazia,  South  Ossetia, 
and Ngorno Karabakh. All the countries of the region  have to cope with large 
numbers of refugees, disrupted economies, ethnic tension, and the menace of 
renewed war.  Several projects in Georgia have beef! supported by Tacis which 
are aimed at contributing to conflict resolution. 
VERTIC  (Verification Technology  Information  Centre),  a British-based  NGO, 
has been  involved in three Tacis projects. Two of the projects were in partner-
ship with  the Youth  Council  and  one  was  in  partnership  with  the Caucasian 
Institute for Peace and  Democracy and the  Institute for War and  Peace  Re-
porting in  London. The aims of the first two projects were NGO development 
and  confidence  building  measures  in  the  conflict  zones,  particularly  South 
Ossetia.  VERTIC was  instrumental in  establishing the youth  council,  an  um-
brella organisation of 67 youth groups.  Initially, the confidence building meas-
ures  were  targeted  at  young  people but  gradually  VERTIC  has  moved  to a 
more elite level  involving parliamentarians and economists. The third project 
involved the training of journalists, conferences and discussion groups involv-
ing journalists and others in the whole Transcaucasian region and the publica-
tion of an  English language media digest.  VERTIC organised a visit for the 
Speaker of the Ossetian parliament to Tibilisi in January which enabled him to 
meet both Zhvania and Shevardnadze. They also helped to establish coopera-
tion among Ossetian and Georgian economists who produced a report about 
economic  co-operation  which  is  thought  to  have  made  an  input  into  the 
agreement signed in Moscow in March. 
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly  had a Tacis wide project on  building transna-
tional civil society in conflict areas.  In the Caucasus region, this involved local 
branches in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ngorno Karabakh as well as a 
Caucasus wide refugee committee. The groups have been  able to co-operate 
successfully in pressing for the release of prisoners of war and hostages, and 
working together on refugee problems. The Georgian Round Table and Organ-
isers  workshops  funded  under the  macro-project,  helped  to  build  links  with 
Abkhazia and Northern Caucasus and led to a meeting of NGOs and refugee 
groups in Pitsander, Abkhazia which led to the establishment of an  Abkhazian 
branch. 
The International Center on Conflict and Negotiation is about to start a conflict 
resolution  project  in  Abkhazia  together  with  the  British-based  International 
Alert. 
In our view, the way in which the PTDP has been able to adapt to 
the specific circumstances in  each  country has been  largely due 
to the bottom-up character of the programme. Since grantees put 
forward  their  own  ideas  through  the  competition  process,  they 
influence the pattern of grants. Those inside the country are much 
more likely to have a clear idea of the problems of their countries 
and  their proposals  reflect the  needs  of  their  countries  as  they 
perceive them. The criteria for selection and the selection process 
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itself is  also important since many projects get turned down; this 
allows for some outside input into priority setti~g. 
4.3  Implementation of Projects-
Consistency, Efficiency, and Adequacy of Procedures 
By consistency we  mean the extent to which projects were con-
sistent with  the  guidelines of the  PTDP  and  the  extent to  which 
projects were consistent along the lines proposed. In all countries, 
our finding was that consistency was generally good. 
By efficiency, we are referring to the efficiency of implementation 
of the projects. This depends both on  the nature of the  recipient 
organisations and on the overall environment for NGOs. 
As  regards the  recipient organisations two factors  are  important. 
One  is the  level of professional capacity; experience in  manage-
ment,  accounting, proposal and  report writing.  The other is  what 
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might be described as movement capacity - the ability to  mobilise 
people, to attract volunteers, and to make a public impact. 
These  two  factors  are  very  rarely  compatible.  The  most  profes-
sional organisations are often the least likely to display movement 
capacities.  Especially,  but  not  only,  in  Tacis  countries,  post-
Communist structures are often best able technically to implement 
projects  but  are  rarely  able  to  provide  added  social  dynamism. 
Thus, for example, projects aimed at modernising Georgian trade 
unions or at training Georgian journalists were  adequately imple-
mented within the terms of reference of the  original  projects but 
their impact was  limited because of  the  inflexibility of  the  institu-
tions  which  were  responsible  for  implementation.  On  the  other 
hand,  more  movement  type  organisations  often  have  difficulty 
95/2172 81-media Skills and Management Training· Georgia 
This  project,  undertaken  by  the  BBC  and  Deutsche  Welle  - Radio  Training 
Centre  together with  Georgian  TV  and  Radio,  the  state  broadcasting  com-
pany,  is  a good  example of  the  problems that  arise from  the  inflexibility  of 
post-Communist organisations. The aim of the project was to provide training 
in  news  programming  for  both  radio  and  television  so  'that  the  broadcast 
media can provide their audiences with the reliable and  impartial information 
needed to make informed choices about all  aspects  of  life'.  The training pro-
grammes were successful in the sense that those journalists who participated 
felt that they learned a great deal and that the experience had been  very  re-
warding.  The trainers joined the journalists in  preparing  news  packages  and 
these were shown on  national television.  Moreover, the management training 
courses  were  also  highly appreciated  - one  manager commented  'This  has 
been a week of dreams'. The project also helped to build bridges between the 
Georgian broadcasters and the European partners. 
The problems arose from the reluctance of  news editors to participate in  the 
programmes,  the  inadequacy  of  equipment,  the  lack  of  professional  experi-
ence and the limited room for manoeuvre for managers. According to the final 
report of the project: 
'Television journalists can be shown  how to produce effective and interesting 
stories but if the editors will not put them on  air,  nor organise work schedules 
to enable good journalism to take place,  nor accept the need  for change  in 
editorial values, ambitious young journalists will become disillusioned. 
Radio journalists can  be  taught  interviewing  and  packaging  techniques,  but 
without  the  technology  to  process  audio  quickly  and  efficiently,  they  will 
choose the only real option - the written single-voice report. 
Managers cannot put into effect lessons on  organisation and managerial best 
practise unless empowered to do so.' 
After the training,  television  news  'reverted  back  to  the  old  sterile  format'. 
More success was  achieved in  training commercial  radio  and  television  sta-
tions. 
51 52 
Qualitative Impact  PTDP Evaluation Report 
complying  with  PTDP  requirements.  We  did  come  across some 
examples  of  organisations  which  were  able  to  straddle  both 
worlds and  to  combine  a professional approach with  movement-
type dynamism. These include the  Civic Institute in  Slovakia, the 
Pro-Democracy Association  in  Romania,  the  Central  Asian  Sus-
tainable Development Network (CASDIN) in Kazakhstan. 
In  terms of the environment in which NGOs operate, many NGOs 
face  constraints which  are  not always  appreciated  by donor or-
ganisations. These include: 
- Difficulties of registration, especially in  Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
In Russia, the fee for registration is very high. 
- High taxation of NGOs which is not taken into account in budget-
ing. Slovak NGOs have to pay VAT, for example. 
- Problems  of  postage  in  Tacis  countries.  For  Russia,  it  is  very 
difficult to  send original documents to  Brussels since these are 
required by the local tax office. 
- Difficulties of opening a foreign currency bank account. 
- Lack of allowance for inflation which  is very high in  some coun-
tries. 
- Problems of co-financing  and  of  coping  with  a system  of  final 
payments. 
As can be seen from Table 7 at the end of this chapter, efficiency 
of implementation seems to have been higher in  the Phare coun-
tries than  in  the  Tacis  countries.  Among  the  Phare  countries,  it 
was weakest in  Estonia at least as regards the projects that were 
evaluated  and  among  the  Tacis  countries,  it  was  greatest  in 
Kazakhstan. The difference between Phare and Tacis countries is 
partly due to the more advanced development of NGOs and partly 
due to the fact that NGOs in  Tacis countries are operating under 
greater constraints than in Phare countries. (5) 
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There  are complaints  about the adequacy of procedures in  all 
the countries we visited. These include complaints about delays in 
signing contracts and payments, most frequent, complaints about 
the complexity of requirements for proposals,  reports and budget-
ing, and complaints about the difficulty of communication and the 
lack of feedback. The management of the programme as a whole 
is  dealt with  in  Chapter 5.  But  it  is  worth  noting that complaints 
about procedures seem to be greater where efficiency is weakest. 
This may be because weak recipient organisations are least able 
to cope with complex administrative requirements and with delays 
in contracts and payments. It may also be partly explained by the 
natural attempt to find scapegoats for weaknesses. 
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4.4  Short-term Impact -
on Individuals, Networking, and Visibility 
Perhaps the most important immediate impact of PTDP projects is 
the impact on individuals engaged in the projects. First and per-
haps most importantly, the projects enable those employed by the 
projects  to  become  professionals  and  to  work  full-time  on  civic 
activity. In every country, we came across individuals whose lives 
and  career patterns had  been  changed by participation  in  PTDP 
projects.  In  the Tacis countries, where incomes are  very low and 
the  struggle  for  survival  is  all-encompassing,  this  is  especially 
important.  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  the  growth  of  the  NGO 
sector is artificially stimulated by foreign funds. Although we found 
many individuals who were  able to devote time to  NGO work only 
because  of  the  availability  of  funding,  we  did  not  come  across 
anyone  for whom  this  was  a primary  motivation.  Those  whose 
GRADO - Romanian Group for the Defence of Human Rights 
This organisation was  founded  in  1994 by  Mihai  Popescu.  It  is  a  rela-
tively small organisation with  12 employees (3-4 on each project).  It  is 
located in a run  down apartment bloc where  it  has three small  offices. 
They  have  received  three  Phare  micro-projects.  The  first  project  was 
concerned  with  the  reintegration  of  returning  Romanian  migrants  into 
Romanian  society and  of women  who  have served  prison  sentences. 
The second project was concerned with minors and their relationship to 
authority.  They  produced  information  leaflets  on  penal  law  and  other 
information material relevant to offenders and prisoners.  The third proj-
ect is about  legal monitoring of human rights in prisons. They have also 
received  support  from  Ll EN  for their work  with  women  and  minors  in 
prison, especially as regards human rights and rehabilitation. Other work 
includes therapy for reoffenders  and theatre in prison. 
This NGO is involved in  prison work on  an  every day basis and in this 
respect  performs a  vital  service.  It  is the daily involvement that  is  so 
crucial in a  system that was traditionally closed and authoritarian. The 
NGO is  able to facilitate communication between  prisoners and prison 
officers  and  contribute to opening  up the  prison  system.  Though  it  is 
located in Bucharest, it tries to operate on a nation wide basis.  It is diffi-
cult unglamorous work on  an  issue which  has  not  yet  generated  much 
public support. 
The president, Mihai Popescu is an engineer by profession who formerly 
had  his  own  business.  He  had  done volunteer work  in  prisons  before 
starting GRADO. He is an  impressive man,  highly articulate,  dedicated 
and  energetic who  is  obviously not  motivated by financial gain,  nor by 
prestige. His moral authority has attracted many young volunteers. PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
primary motivation is financial are  more  likely to  turn  to  business 
or  other  occupations.  We  met  a  number  of  extraordinary  indi-
viduals who were able, thanks to  the  PTDP, to  devote their lives 
to trying to improve their societies. 
As well as funding,  PTDP projects provide a learning experience. 
In  addition to  those projects explicitly aimed at training for NGOs 
or civic education, the  process of  implementing the  projects pro-
vides  on-the-job  training  which  many  recipients  have  stressed. 
Indeed,  several  individuals  suggested  that this  is  a  much  more 
effective form  of  learning than formal training  courses where the 
techniques are  often forgotten  if not immediately utilised.  In  par-
ticular in several countries, notably Hungary and Slovakia, partici-
pation in micro-projects has provided the necessary experience to 
enable individuals and NGOs to 'graduate' to macro-projects. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  and  least  measurable  impact  of-
PTDP projects has been to stimulate civic attitudes and activities. 
In  several  of  the  Round  Tables,  participants  from  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe stressed the  subjective  character of democracy. 
In  Poland,  democracy was defined in  terms of the  dignity of  citi-
zens; the  knowledge that sovereignty belongs to  the  citizen  and 
that  officials  are  the  servants  of  citizens  even  if  they  are  not 
aware  of  this.  A  participant  at  the  Romanian  Round  Table 
stressed that democracy, for her,  meant a widening  of  horizons, 
an opening up of opportunities, a sense that you  as an  individual 
can  choose your future.  In  Georgia,  young  people stressed how 
difficult it is to learn to act as an  individual, to make your own de-
cisions,  to  take  responsibility  I  to  be  able  to  act  differently  from 
everyone  else  I  to  follow  your conscience  and  not the  collective 
will.  PTDP  projects  have  contributed  to  this  changing  mentality, 
partly  through  open  discussions  and  seminars,  partly  through 
contacts with partners, and most importantly through the sense of 
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empowerment  that  develops  when  implementing  a  project  suc-
cessfully. 
Networking  is  an  impor:tant  aspect  of  macro-projects  because 
these  projects  have  to  involve  a transnational  partnership  to  be 
eligible. Initially, these were East-West partnerships but now East-
East  partnerships  are  encouraged.  In  general,  the  transfer  of 
know-how  and  skills,  the  interaction  with  Western  partners,  and 
the  mutual  support,  is  welcomed.  It  should  be  stressed  that the 
Western  partners  also  benefit.  For  many  Western  NGOs,  in-
volvement in, the  PTDP has helped to attract other funding and to 
add  new  dimensions  and  ways  of  working.  Involvement  in  the 
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PTDP  raises  consciousness  about  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
and  introduces  new  perspectives  about  democracy  which  are 
relevant in  Western  Europe  as well.  The  East-West communica-
tion  fostered  by  the  PTDP  has  led  to  new  ideas  and  concepts 
concerning  European  integration  and  helps  to  draw  attention  to PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
specific issues in recipient countries both through greater publicity 
in the West and through the lobbying activities of Western NGOs. 
SODICOBA  - Social  Dialogue  and  International  Cooperation  in  the 
Baltic Sea Region 
This macro project (95/3145) put forward jointly by  a large number of 
trade  union  organisations  in  almost  all  Baltic  Sea  countries  aims  to 
strengthen  the  social  influence  and  the  organisational  capacities  of 
trade unions in the region of St.  Petersburg  and in the Baltic states. At 
the same time it provides a new way of networking among trade unions 
between  East  and  West.  Joint  training,  seminars  and  conferences 
have  led to  a series  of  important  programmes  which  have attracted 
funding  from other Phare programmes (Phare Partnership)  as  well  as 
from governments to support this network. 
In a number of cases, recipients complained of dominance by the 
Western  partner.  This  was  often  the  case  where  the  Western 
partner was the  lead organisation and where  the  local organisa-
tion was  relatively weak.  Moreover, there seems to  have been  a 
learning  process.  In  the  first  few  rounds  of  PTDP  projects,  the 
lead was taken by Western partners but in  later rounds, the local 
partners became  the  lead  organisations  and  the  division  of  the 
budget and the tasks was negotiated in a more satisfactory way. 
Complaints about the dominance of Western partners were more 
frequent in Tacis countries than  in  Phare countries. This is partly 
to be explained by the  weakness of  local  organisations  and  the 
shorter time in  which the programme has been  running.  An  addi-
tional problem for Tacis countries has been the difficulty of finding 
appropriate partners. This is partly due to  distance.  NGOs  in  re-
mote parts of Russia have a hard enough time finding partners in 
Moscow let alone Western Europe. But it is also the case that on 
many of the  issues  which  concern  Tacis  NGOs  - human  rights 
and  democratic  development  - the  most  appropriate  Western 
partners  are  those  most  likely to  be  preoccupied  with  their do-
mestic situation  and  least interested  in  international  links.  Part-
nership conferences might be one way of solving this problem. 
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In  both  Phare  and  Tacis  countries,  East-East  partnerships  are 
particularly  valued  because  they  offer  an  opportunity  to  share 
common  experiences  and  learn  from  each  other.  As  yet,  East-
East partnerships have not been  very developed although  Polish 
NGOs  have  been  very  active  in  Belarus  and  the  Baltic  states. 
While  there  have  also  been  complaints  of  Polish  dominance, 
these efforts have been highly appreciated. 
9513270 Belarusslan NGO development project 
This  macro-project is  led by the  Institute for Democracy in  Eastern  Europe 
(IDEE)  in  Warsaw  with  the  participation  of  the  Civil  Society  Centre 
'Supolnosc' of  Belarus and a number of  other Belarussian NGOs.  The proj-
ect  has  achieved  a great  deal  of  support  among  Belarussian  NGOs  and 
enjoys an excellent reputation.  It involves a large number of NGOs,  it is not 
confined to  Minsk and,  indeed,  it  reaches  many small  organisations  in  the 
provinces and  offers  real  support.  It  has  very  high  visibility and  the  Polish 
partner,  building  on  experience  in  Central  Europe,  has  made  an  effort  to 
spend resources so as to directly benefit Belarussian NGOs. PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
By visibility we mean both the visibility of the projects - how many 
people are reached and the impact on the media - and the visibil-
ity of the  EU.  The visibility of projects varies considerably.  Some 
projects aimed at training or the transfer of techniques do not aim 
for  visibility.  Other  projects  have  been  highly  visible,  have  at-
tracted  many  volunteers  and  really  made  a  public  impact.  In 
many cases,  micro-projects have  been  more  visible  than  macro-
projects  because  they  are  undertaken  by  the  more  movement 
type of NGO. Moreover, where there have been large numbers of 
micro-projects,  as  in  Hungary  or  Romania,  the  programme  in-
volves  large  numbers  of  people  and  becomes widely  known.  In 
Hungary, some tens of thousands of people have participated in 
one way or another in the Phare democracy programme. 
272/ROM/95 Women In Modern Society 
This micro-project was run  by the XXI  Century Foundation which  is centred 
around a cultural magazine which has a very high profile among the Roma-
nian  intelligentsia.  This gives the foundation  a focus  and  an  outlet  and  its 
projects are geared towards the publication of special issues for a wide audi-
ence. The project concerned the position of women in Romanian society and 
feminism.  Four workshops and a colloquium were held  attended by leading 
public figures,  social  scientists  and  journalists  and  the  issue  in  which  the 
debates  and  proceedings  were  published  was  a  great  success  and  was 
quickly sold out. The colloquium generated a great deal of publicity involving 
radio and TV and this helped to propagandise the issue of gender in  a much 
wider milieu.  This  is  important  in  a country  such  as  Romania  where  very 
little public awareness of this issue exists.  The  project was,  therefore,  suc-
cessful, visible with both tangible and less tangible social outcomes. For this 
NGO the  project  was  part  of  a  learning  process  and  the  accumulation  of 
such experience will, they hope, enable them to  run  much larger projects in 
the future. 
Since some projects have been  highly visible  in  almost all  coun-
tries, the programme as  a whole  seems to  have  rather high  visi-
bility.  An  exception  is  Georgia  perhaps  because  projects  have 
been rather few and often dominated by Western partners. 
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The  high  visibility of  the  programme  as  well  as  seminars,  round 
tables and conferences  aimed  at  explaining  and  promoting  the 
programme also  contributes to  the  visibility of the  European  Un-
ion.  In every country, the importance of the EU label was empha-
sised for a number of reasons.  First of all,  the  EU  label  adds to 
the prestige of the project. It is a kind of stamp of legitimacy which 
helps to  attract funding and other kind  of support.  In  Poland par-
ticularly,  it  was  argued  that  the  EU  label  greatly  increases  the 
credibility  of  the  NGO  sector.  In  all  countries  but  especially  in 
those countries with an authoritarian past, there is a tendency for 
the  elites to  dismiss citizens groups as  unserious and  not worth 
listening to. Democracy is understood in formal terms and citizens 
groups are  often  considered a nuisance interfering  in  the  normal 
parliamentary processes.  Support from  the  EU  helps to  change 
those attitudes which  is an  important element in  the evolving po-
litical culture. 
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Secondly,  the  EU  label  offers  a form  of  protection  in  countries 
with  authoritarian  tendencies.  This  has  been  very  important  in 
Romania before the 1996 elections, in Slovakia, in  Belarus and in 
Kazakhstan.  In  Belarus, the  government has tried to  interfere  in PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
the  NGO  sector particularly  as  regards  youth  organisations  and 
humanitarian organisations and has actually succeeded in closing 
down the  Sores Foundation. But it has not been  able to  interfere 
with  EU  funded  projects.  In  Slovakia!  the  NGO  sector which  is 
very visibly supported by the  EU  has  become  the  main  form  of 
opposition to the Meciar government. 
Thirdly, and very importantly, the  PTDP  offers a signal about the 
character of the  EU  -its values and goals. The  PTDP  is probably 
more  visible  at  a  local  community  level  than  other  EU  pro-
grammes.  The  fact  that  the  programme  is  independent  of  the 
government and  that it  is  clearly  seen  to  support  civic  activities 
helps to popularise the EU as a democratic, multi-cultural organi-
sation  (even  though  this  is sometimes offset by the  negative im-
age resulting from bad experiences with contracts and payments). 
4.5  Long-term Impact- Replicability and Sustainability 
By  replicability, we  mean  replicability  in  institutional  terms.  To 
what  extent  have  the  projects  contributed  to  institution-building 
which will enable both the grantees and other NGOs to undertake 
similar projects in the future? 
Undoubtedly, the PTDP has significantly contributed to institution-
building.  In particular, micro-projects have been very important in 
helping to establish new NGOs especially outside of capital cities. 
The  micro-projects have had a wide  outreach  and  have  contrib-
uted  to  the  growth  of  what  are  known  as  'second  generation' 
NGOs. After successfully completing a micro-project, a number of 
NGOs  have  acquired  the  capacity  to  apply  for  larger  macro-
projects. 
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However, macro-projects are  equally important.  In  every country, 
it is possible to identify one or two 'first generation' NGOs who act 
as  'mother  organisations'  to  the  second  generation  - providing 
advice, information, organising networking and co-operation. Thus 
the  Helsinki Committee/Helsinki Citizens Assembly/Group for So-
cial  Dialogue, led by Gabriel Andrescu,  plays such  a role  in  Ro-
mania.  In  Russia, the Moscow Centre for Human Rights was able 
to contribute to the development of many new NGOs through the 
macro-project  Organisation  of Human  Rights  Network (93/0398) 
and  the  work  continued  after the  projects  was  completed.  The 
project  Armed  Forces  and  Society  (95/21 0)  had  a  similar 
'snowball' effect and led to  the creation of regional  human  rights 
groups.  In  Slovakia,  the  larger NGOs,  which  depend on  macro-
projects,  have  played  an  important  role  in  organising  forms  of 
association (gremium) among NGOs which  has helped to protect 
them from government interference. 
NGOs and Poverty Alleviation In Central Asia (94/1004) 
The  Central Asian  Sustainable Development Network in  Kazakhstan came into 
being with support from private donors. Through the Tacis project, undertaken in 
partnership with the International NGO Training and Research  Centre in Oxford 
(INTRAC), CASDIN provides support to other NGOs - collecting and disseminat-
ing  information,  providing  technical  assistance  and  establishing  contacts  to 
other NGOs,  government  and  the  business  sector.  It  publishes the  bi-monthly 
Sustainable  Development,  which  provides  information  on  local,  regional,  and 
international NGOs and holds seminars and workshops.  It trains other NGOs in 
project management and  organising  conferences  and  seminars.  It  maintains a 
library and database on  the whole of  Central  Asia  and  on  international  NGOs 
who have projects in Kazakhstan. 
At the end of  1996, CASDIN inaugurated the Charter of the Association of Non-
Commercial  Non-Governmental  Organisations  of  Kazakhstan  (ANCGOK)  a 
coalition of NGOs from every region of  Kazakhstan. Given that the tertiary sec-
tor has grown  considerably  in  Kazakhstan  in  the last few years  but the NGOs 
lack training, expertise and experience and are often struggling in a hostile envi-
ronment, the achievement of CASDIN is noteworthy. 
By  sustainability we  mean  the  ability  to  find  financial  support 
after the project ends. Most NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe 
are dependent on  foreign funding. This is both due to the legacy 
of totalitarianism where people were forced to  engage in  political PTDP Evaluation Report  Qualitative Impact 
activity and donations to  trade  unions or peace committees were 
compulsory; hence there is no tradition and in some cases active 
reluctance  towards  voluntary  contributions.  In  addition  these 
countries are poorer than  Western countries and there are fewer 
available  resources.  The  ability  to  generate  internal  sources  of 
finance is weakest in  the  Tacis countries both  because the  leg-
acy of totalitarianism is greater and  because these countries are 
in the midst of severe economic crises.  Few people can  afford to 
offer services or to give money. 
Among  NGOs,  there  is currently considerable debate about how 
to generate internal funding. A number of NGOs are beginning to 
undertake  income-generating  activities  such  as  running  confer-
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ences or seminars or training  programmes  or other services,  or 
selling  literature,  although  the  legal  status  of  these  activities  is 
unclear in  several  countries.  Some  organisations  have  member-
ship  although  this  rarely  generates  sufficient  resources.  Other 
donors are local businesses who are beginning to  realise the link 
between a market economy and  the development of civil  society 
and  local  governments.  In  Central  Europe,  successful  projects 
have sometimes been able to attract local government funding. 
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13/POU94 Integration programme: Rights of Refugees 
This  micro-project was  run  by the  'Podkowa Klub'  Cultural  Centre  in  Podkowa 
Lesna  (near Warsaw).  It  helps  Armenian  refugees  living  in  refugee  camps  in 
Podkowa  Lesna  to  better  adapt  to  the  Polish  environment  and  improve  their 
psychological condition.  The  project  has  provided  a lot  of  support to the  refu-
gees including reliable first-hand neYis from their home towns and areas.  It was 
also  rather successful  in  establishing personal  contacts between  refugees  and 
the local population and building trust and better understanding  on  both  sides. 
The visibility of  the project in  Podkowa  Lesna  has  been  very high.  Its sustain-
ability is also high since the Centre is continuing the work  with local government 
funding. 
An  innovative  example  of  sustainability  was  the  macro-project 
Coordination  Centre  for NGOs  in  North-West  Russia  (95/3449) 
which ran workshops and advisory sessions for NGOs in  Archan-
gelsk,  Pskov,  Novgorod  and  Petrovodsk.  Instead  of  charging  a 
fee for its Consultancy work a 'voucher' was given. This could be 
'worked off' by the NGO in tum helping other NGOs in their region 
and giving proof of this. 
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Despite these efforts, foreign funding will remain  crucial for some 
time  to  come.  Undoubtedly,  PTDP  funding  helps  sustain  ability 
because  the  EU  label  often  attracts  other foreign  funding.  Suc-
cessful  ~projects are  able  to  continue  their  work  by  diversifying 
their  sources  of  finance.  It  should  be  stressed,  however,  that 
many Western donors, particularly American donors, are  moving 
eastwards,  on  the  grounds  that  democratisation  has  been 
achieved in Central Europe. Thus in Central Europe, dependence 
on  the  PTDP  is  greater than  before  and  it is  very important that 
the Phare programme is continued. 
4.6 Overall Political Impact 
Our overall conclusion is that the  main  impact of the  PTDP is on 
the growth of the NGO sector and therefore the political impact is 
largely  indirect via the  political  influence  of  the  NGO  sector.  Of 
course, the NGO sector itself is a key component  of substantive 
democracy;  an  important  medium  through  which  individual  citi-
zens can participate in public affairs. In several countries we were 
told that, after the first flush  of democratisation when political ac-
tivists  engaged  directly  in  party  politics,  democratically  minded 
people who are  committed to changing their societies have cho-
sen  instead to  become  involved  in  NGOs.  Apart from  the  post-
Communist parties, membership in  political parties is  low. There-
fore, the  NGOs have become the  main  forum  for civic participa-
tion.  The  NGOs constitute  a form  of  access to  government and 
international  institutions,  through  which  individuals  can  develop 
ideas and put forward proposals. 
There are several reasons why the main impact of the PTDP is on 
the NGO sector. First of all, only NGOs are eligible for macro- and 
micro-projects.  Secondly,  NGO  development  is  easily  the  most 
important component of the programme. Thirdly, the emphasis of 
65 66 
Qualitative Impact  PTOP Evaluation Report 
the programme is itself indirect; the aim is to offer technical assis-
tance,  to  provide  the  know-how  to  engage  in  democracy rather 
than to engage in political issues directly. 
The NGO sector contributes to  the process of democratisation in 
three ways.  First of  all, the  NGOs represent a pressure from be-
low for democratic reform.  NGOs  in  Belarus and  Russia,  for ex-
ample supported by Tacis, campaign for penal reform and against 
torture  in  prisons.  In  Slovakia,  NGOs  supported  by  Phare  have 
campaigned  against  the  Language  Laws  which  discriminate 
against  Hungarians  and  against the  Law  on  Foundations which 
would restrict the autonomy of NGOs. 
Secondly,  NGOs draw attention  to  problems  in  their society and 
represent a form of critical monitoring of the process of democra-
tisation.  This  is  why  the  partnership  element of  the  PTDP  is  so 
important.  Via  partners,  NGOs  can  alert  the  international  com-
munity and  influence public opinion  in  other countries as  well  as 
policymakers. Belarus, for example, is not a country that receives 
much Western public attention. It has been largely the NGOs and 
their  partners,  particularly  in  Poland  and  Germany,  who  have 
raised concerns about the reversal of the democratic process. 
Thirdly,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  the  NGO  sector contrib-
utes  to  the  development  of  a  democratic  political  culture.  The 
NGOs represent a 'reservoir for the  spread  of democratic ideas' 
(Georgian  Background  Study),  a  medium  for  transmitting  civic 
values. It seems very likely that the changed atmosphere, particu-
larly  in  Central  Europe,  on  issues like  racism  or gender can,  at 
least in part, be attributed to the growth of NGOs. These changing 
attitudes do  affect politics  and  voting  behaviour.  Totalitarianism 
always  involved  a degree  of  tacit  consent;  these  changing  atti-
tudes  help to  prevent a reversion  to  totalitarianism  especially  in 
places like  Belarus or Kazakhstan  where  old-style  leaders are  in 
power. PTOP Evaluation Report 
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In our view, Romania and Slovakia represent particular successes 
for the  PTDP.  In  Slovakia,  it  is  the  NGO  sector,  strongly  sup-
ported by the  PTDP,  which  has  carried  the  main  burden  of  op-
position to  Meciar's authoritarian tendencies. The sector is exem-
plary,  in  terms  of  effectiveness,  outreach  and  co-operation. 
Through a variety of programmes aimed at education for democ-
racy  or human  rights  or through  providing  platforms for political 
debates, attitudes in  Slovakia are  changing. Although this has to 
be partly explained in terms of the increased co-operation among 
the  opposition  parties,  recent  opinion  polls  which  show  Meciar 
strongly under challenge from the  opposition can  at least in  part 
be attributed to the activities of NGOs. 
In  Romania, some participants at the  Round Table attributed the 
success of the democratic opposition in the  1996 elections to  the 
growth of the NGO sector. First of all, the growth of NGOs in  the 
countryside where  llescu  depended for most of his support may 
have  contributed  to  changing  traditional  attitudes.  Secondly, 
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NGOs  helped  during  the  elections  providing  the  activist  man-
power which opposition parties tacked. Thirdly, the elections were 
much fairer than previous elections. Although fraud was probably 
Project 95/2259 Permanent Civic Institute Conference 
The Civic Institute has  its  roots  in  the original civic organisation  in  Slovakia in 
1989, Public Against Violence - this was the Slovak counterpart of  Civic Forum 
which  led the 1989 revolution. The institute has some links with the parliamen-
tary  democratic  opposition,  particularly  the  Democratic  Party,  the  Christian 
Democratic Movement  and  the  Hungarian  Independent  Initiative.  Their macro-
project  is  fully focused  on  the  weakest  aspects  of  Slovak democracy - lack  of 
public awareness, political apathy even cynicism, deficits in democratic practice, 
racism and particularly the culturally inherited  anti-Semitism.  The project aims 
at  establishing  democratic civic clubs  holding  regular  meetings  in  most  of  the 
urban  centres.  They  have  surpassed  the  20  towns  they  have  specified  in  the 
project and have already established 50  of them.  In each  of these places,  local 
activists, recruited and trained by the Institute, are responsible for the organisa-
tion of meetings on important aspects of civic culture and human rights with well 
known  persons  and  experts.  Attendances  have  varied  so  far between  30  and 
400.  Media coverage has  been  good and  the clubs  are  becoming  a significant 
public platform for debate about democracy especially after the abortive referen-
dum on the constitution. The Western partner is the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy. 
minor in previous elections and did not distort the election results, 
there  was  no  fraud  in  the  1996 elections both  because  the  op-
position vote was too  large  to  manipulate in minor ways and be-
cause of monitoring efforts by the NGO community. 
The  overall  impact on  Tacis countries has been  much  less than 
the  overall  impact on  Phare  countries.  In  part,  this  is  to  be  ex-
plained by the fact that Tacis countries have received tower levels 
of funding and the programme started later.  It also has to  be  ex-
plained by the  fact that indigenous  NGO  capacities  are  weaker 
reducing the efficiency, visibility,  sustainability and  replicability of 
Tacis projects.  Another reason  is  that projects  have  been  more 
top-down.  There  have  been  more  ad  hoc  projects  and  macro-
projects,  especially  in  Russia,  have  put  more  emphasis  on  the 
interaction  between NGOs and state institutions and/or training of 
officials. Undoubtedly these projects have been useful but we are 
not convinced that this is the  most effective way to  stimulate the (6) 
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democratisation  process;  moreover,  it  does  not  enhance  the 
reputation  of  the  democracy programme  to  a similar degree.  A 
considerable amount has been spent on the training of parliamen-
tarians.  Clearly,  this  is  important  but  given  our findings  that,  in 
general training is  most successful where the experience can  be 
applied, it could be argued that outside pressure to  reform parlia-
ments may be more effective. Official election monitoring has also 
received  a  large  share  of  the  budget.  We  have  come  across 
some very interesting and effective examples of non-official elec-
tion  monitoring  undertaken  by the  Society  for  Free  Elections  in 
Georgia,  for  example  (funded  by  the  National  Endowment  for 
Democracy)  or the  Pro-Democracy Association  in  Romania (see 
below). Clearly official international election monitoring has to  be 
done but it might be  better funded  under a separate budget es-
pecially for the purpose. 
95/2297, Voter Education for 1996 Elections 
The  Pro-Democracy  Association  is  probably  the  most  successful  Romanian 
NGO of its type.  It has had major advantages over some of the other NGOs in 
that they  received  substantial  financial  assistance  as  well  as  training from  an 
American organisation - National Democracy Institute - from  its very inception. 
Though  this support  is  now  coming  to  an  end  it  has  achieved  its  purpose  in 
establishing a powerful, efficient and successful NGO which due to the training 
received developed a professional approach before other NGOs. This NGO  has 
the experience and know how to run  large projects in  a leading capacity and to 
attract  large  numbers  of  volunteers.  The  primary  goal  of  this  organisation  is 
citizens participation  in  public affairs and  for this  purpose the  association  has 
engaged in  numerous activities and projects involving public education such as 
publication of information and educational materials, and  organisation of public 
debates,  colloquia  and  meetings.  The  association  also  monitors  government 
activities and  lobbies for change  of  legislation particularly  in  the  human  rights 
area. Apart from the macro project they have also done 5-6 micro projects. 
The  macro  project was  on  voter education  and  monitoring  of  the  1996  local, 
parliamentary and presidential  elections.  The  project  recruited  6000  volunteers 
who monitored the elections and helped with voter education.  (The project was, 
however,  seriously handicapped by the delays in the Commission. The  money 
for the monitoring of the parliamentary and  presidential elections, for instance, 
arrived after the elections had been held forcing both a change in the project and 
financial difficulties for the NGO -they had to borrow). 
As well as the impact on  the NGO sector, the other major impact 
of the  PTDP  has been  to  popularise  the  European  Union  espe-
cially in countries which have micro-projects. The programme has 
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made a link between the  idea of  Europe and the values of toler-
ance and  openness promoted by the programme. The  European 
commitment  to  democracY.  and  to  the  goals  of  the  NGOs  sup-
ported  - social  responsibility,  anti-racism,  human  rights,  minority 
rights,  etc.- is  seen  to  be  more  than  just  rhetoric  currently 
mouthed by all governments. If the problems with contracts, which 
have  contributed  to  a perception  of  the  EU  as  overly  bureau-
cratic,  could be  solved, then perhaps the  PTDP's most important 
asset is  as  a cost-effective way of promoting  an  idea of  Europe 
based on democracy, citizenship and human rights. P
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o
d
,
 
s
o
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
s
k
i
l
l
s
,
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
u
s
e
f
u
l
 
M
i
c
r
o
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
p
o
l
l
l
l
c
a
l
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
m
i
c
r
o
,
 
1
 
a
d
 
e
n
o
u
g
h
 
o
n
 
w
e
a
k
 
m
a
c
r
o
-
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
m
a
n
y
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
a
r
e
a
s
,
 
m
i
c
r
o
s
 
h
o
w
e
v
e
t
f
 
N
G
O
s
 
l
o
o
k
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
r
i
s
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
U
n
i
o
n
 
h
o
c
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
l
i
e
s
.
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
 
a
l
s
o
 
f
o
r
 
'
1
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
o
u
t
r
e
a
c
h
 
l
m
-
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
N
G
O
s
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
D
O
r
i
a
n
!
 
K
a
u
k
h
a
t
a
n
 
4
 
m
a
c
r
o
 
E
m
p
h
a
s
i
s
 
o
n
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
W
i
t
h
 
o
n
e
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
e
l
a
y
s
 
I
n
 
l
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
l
 
l
o
r
 
l
n
d
i
v
i
·
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
V
e
r
y
 
h
i
g
h
 
v
i
s
i
b
H
i
t
y
 
W
i
d
e
 
o
u
t
r
e
a
c
h
 
E
U
 
l
a
b
e
l
 
h
e
l
p
s
 
t
o
 
T
a
c
l
s
 
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
 
h
a
s
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
h
i
g
h
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
N
G
O
s
 
a
n
d
 
g
o
o
d
 
e
x
o
e
p
l
i
o
n
,
 
c
o
n
l
r
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
d
u
a
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
r
 
p
r
o
f
e
s
-
u
s
e
f
u
l
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
h
e
l
p
s
 
I
O
 
a
l
t
r
a
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
m
u
l
t
i
p
H
e
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
;
 
h
e
~
 
t
o
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
 
d
i
s
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
d
 
g
o
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
-
s
i
o
n
a
l
l
 
s
k
i
l
l
s
 
I
n
v
o
l
v
e
 
n
e
w
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
 
N
G
O
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
I
s
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
e
g
 
w
o
m
e
n
 
d
u
r
e
s
 
m
a
i
n
 
f
o
r
m
 
o
f
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
v
e
t
f
t
y
,
 
v
e
r
y
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
 
3
 
m
a
c
r
o
 
E
m
p
h
a
s
i
s
 
o
n
 
c
i
v
i
c
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
M
a
i
n
l
y
 
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
e
l
a
y
s
 
I
n
 
H
i
g
h
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
S
o
m
e
 
c
r
i
t
i
c
i
s
m
 
o
f
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
h
i
g
h
 
W
i
d
e
 
o
U
i
r
e
a
c
h
;
 
S
o
m
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
l
y
 
S
p
r
e
a
d
 
o
f
 
N
G
O
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
h
a
s
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
3
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
g
o
o
d
 
g
o
o
d
.
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
s
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
d
o
m
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
v
i
s
l
b
H
i
t
y
.
 
E
U
 
l
a
b
e
l
 
I
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
n
e
w
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
e
d
 
f
u
n
d
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
I
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
 
m
i
c
r
o
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
l
o
r
 
m
a
c
r
o
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
.
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o
n
s
e
q
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e
n
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t
r
e
n
g
t
-
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
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e
l
p
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I
n
c
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e
a
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!
h
e
 
p
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o
p
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
N
O
O
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n
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o
m
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g
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e
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a
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n
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c
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i
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p
r
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c
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r
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-
c
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o
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h
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c
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n
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1
1
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u
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e
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u
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o
n
s
 
N
G
O
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e
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o
r
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o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
R
o
m
e
n
l
a
 
3
 
m
a
c
r
o
 
h
i
g
h
 
e
m
p
h
a
s
i
s
 
o
n
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
S
o
m
e
 
c
r
i
t
i
c
i
s
m
 
o
f
 
B
i
g
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
n
 
i
n
d
l
v
i
-
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
p
a
r
t
l
c
i
p
a
-
V
e
r
y
 
h
i
g
h
 
v
i
s
i
b
H
i
t
y
.
 
W
i
d
e
 
O
u
t
r
e
a
c
h
:
 
H
e
a
v
y
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
s
 
l
o
r
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
i
s
e
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
g
o
o
d
 
g
o
o
d
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
-
d
u
a
l
s
 
I
n
 
w
i
d
e
n
i
n
g
 
l
i
o
n
 
w
e
l
c
o
m
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
E
U
 
l
a
b
e
l
 
h
e
l
p
s
 
l
o
 
s
t
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
n
g
 
n
e
w
 
o
n
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
f
u
n
d
s
.
 
B
i
g
 
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
;
 
N
G
O
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
w
a
s
 
m
a
i
n
 
f
o
r
m
 
a
n
d
 
5
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
,
 
w
o
m
e
n
,
 
r
e
s
i
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
m
a
c
r
o
-
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
s
;
 
m
i
c
r
o
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
 
o
f
 
k
n
o
w
-
g
i
v
e
 
l
e
g
i
t
i
m
a
c
y
 
t
o
 
N
G
O
s
.
 
N
G
O
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
c
u
s
-
o
f
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
h
e
l
p
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
e
f
e
a
t
 
m
i
c
r
o
 
p
r
i
s
o
n
e
r
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
c
i
v
i
c
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
h
o
w
;
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
I
n
 
N
G
O
s
 
m
a
c
r
o
-
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
s
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
h
o
w
 
t
o
 
l
l
i
e
s
c
u
.
 
N
o
w
 
c
o
-
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
J
e
c
t
s
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
H
i
g
h
l
y
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
p
a
r
t
-
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
g
o
v
 
i
n
 
I
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
t
o
 
n
e
r
s
h
l
p
 
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
N
G
O
s
 
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
 
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
n
 
n
e
e
d
s
 
R
u
 
.
.
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a
c
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o
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N
G
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g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
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V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
C
r
i
l
i
c
i
s
m
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o
f
 
d
e
l
a
y
s
 
i
n
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
1
1
J
l
)
8
C
t
 
o
n
 
W
e
l
c
o
m
e
 
p
a
r
t
·
 
H
i
O
h
 
v
i
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
N
G
O
s
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
v
e
 
a
p
p
r
o
a
-
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
p
r
o
J
e
c
t
s
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
g
o
o
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
 
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
s
;
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
T
 
a
c
l
s
 
t
e
n
d
 
t
o
 
a
d
 
a
s
 
c
h
e
s
 
t
o
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
h
a
s
 
h
a
d
 
a
n
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
a
n
d
2
a
d
 
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
 
I
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
l
i
k
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
E
a
s
t
-
'
m
o
t
h
e
r
'
o
r
g
a
n
l
s
a
t
l
o
n
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
h
o
c
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
a
r
m
e
d
 
E
a
s
t
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
s
 
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
i
m
u
l
a
t
e
 
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
e
g
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
f
o
r
c
e
s
;
 
a
n
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
N
G
O
s
 
'
v
o
u
c
h
e
r
'
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
 
4
 
m
a
c
r
o
 
F
o
c
u
s
 
o
n
 
N
G
O
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
 
C
r
i
t
i
c
i
s
m
 
o
f
 
d
e
l
a
y
s
 
i
n
 
H
a
s
 
h
e
l
p
e
d
 
l
n
d
i
v
i
-
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
-
H
i
g
h
 
v
i
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
 
E
U
 
G
o
o
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c
o
-
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
n
e
c
e
 
o
n
 
N
G
O
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
m
a
i
n
 
f
o
r
m
 
o
f
 
c
i
v
i
c
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
c
i
v
i
c
 
g
o
o
d
 
g
o
o
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
d
u
a
l
s
 
w
h
o
 
h
a
v
e
 
k
i
n
g
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
b
o
t
h
 
l
a
b
e
l
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
f
u
n
d
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,
 
P
h
a
r
e
 
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
;
 
b
u
l
w
a
r
k
 
a
g
a
i
n
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t
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
·
 
a
n
d
 
3
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
 
m
a
c
r
o
-
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
 
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
d
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
.
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t
r
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p
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t
e
c
t
i
o
n
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o
n
g
 
N
G
O
s
 
m
a
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c
r
u
c
i
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i
n
c
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t
h
e
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!
a
r
i
a
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.
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r
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c
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c
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o
n
c
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-
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t
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l
e
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y
 
p
r
o
j
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W
e
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e
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r
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s
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p
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c
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p
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c
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p
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.
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5. Organisation and Procedures of PTDP 
5.1  1992-1997: A Continuous Development 
of Programme and Management Structures 
The  Democracy  Programme  was  developed  in  1992  out  of  an 
initiative  of  the  European  Parliament.  It was  first integrated  into 
the  Phare  Programme  as  a separate  budget line  and  managed 
under the responsibility of the Unit PHOS 3, later renamed US  in 
DGI of the Commission. After producing and circulating guidelines 
for  the  new  programme  in  August  1992,  an  unexpected  high 
number of 350 proposals were turned in by November 1992. With 
help from an  external consultant the  Unit handled the process of 
registering  and  classifying  the  proposals.  By  the  end  of  April 
1993, 52 projects had been selected, which covered a broad area 
of activities. 
For  the  preparation 
of  the  programme 
guidelines  and  the 
selection  process  a 
special expert group 
was created, the so-
called  Advisory 
Group.  This  group 
was  composed  of 
representatives from 
DGI,  Phare  and 
other  interested 
Commission  serv-
ices.  Representa-
Advisory Group Members (1997) 
Helmut Lohan 
Sven Kjellstrom 
Jeremy Lester 
John Penny 
Ernst Piehl 
Fraser Cameron 
Gerard Legris 
Edward McMillan-Scott 
Barry Waters 
Dirk Toornstra 
Jean-Louis Laurens 
Thomas Ouchterlony 
Chris Zyman 
Eva Eberhardt 
Peter Ashman 
David Geer 
Arturo Rodriguez 
DG1AIB5 
DG1AIC6 
DG1AIA/2 
DG1AIAI3 
DGX/4 
European Parliament 
Council of Europe 
INBAS, Observer 
EHRF, Seer. function 
" 
tives of the European Parliament, members of staff from services 
of  the  European  Parliament,  and  members  of  the  Council  of 
Europe were also associated with the group. This Advisory Group 
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has since then continued and played an  important role  in the fur-
ther development of the PTDP. 
The selection process during the first year made it very clear that 
the Commission internally did not have the capacity to  run  a bot-
tom-up  designed  programme  like  PTDP  in  which  hundreds  of 
project  proposals  were  submitted  by  NGOs  from  Western  and 
Eastern  Europe.  However,  the  programme  itself  had  generated 
such  a positive  response  and  a high  political  interest that it was 
decided  in  1993  also  to  include  the  Tacis  countries.  An  internal 
budget of 2 million was allocated for Tacis countries. Because the 
response  to  the  call  for proposals was  so  overwhelming,  it  was 
decided to  increase the  allocation from Tacis  up  to  4 million  and 
to commission the management of the Programme to  an  external 
institution, the European Human Right Foundation. 
The European Human Rights Foundation 
The EHRF was founded in 1980 by the Commission on an initiative of the European Parliament to 
establish an organisation of Human Rights experts, which should help the Commission in organis-
ing NGO and Human Right Programmes. The Foundation has the following objects: 
- "the promotion and protection throughout the world of  civil,  political, economic,  social  and cul-
tural rights - collectively referred to as  human rights - as they are at present laid down in interna-
tional instruments; 
- the furtherance of endeavours to realise aims of a humanitarian nature in general." 
Since 1994 the EHRF has  been  providing technical  assistance to the European  Commission  in 
the management of the PTDP. After a contract for the first year the EHRF won  a second contract 
for the following years as a result of a restricted tender. The EHRF offered the lowest price for the 
requested service. 
In  addition the EHRF provides technical assistance to the Human  Rights  Unit of the Directorate 
General and to the Secretariat-General on issues of bioethics. 
The  EHRF  is  managing  a  European  Human  Rights  Fund  which  is  open  to  applications  from 
NGOs from around the world. The grants seldom exceed 10.000 ECU a year per grant. 
The EHRF manages the PTDP with appr.  17 people,  11  in  Brussels, 3 in the Prague office and 3 
in the Warsaw office. Additionally the EHRF has contracted 12 local agents who  help in  different 
countries. The personnel situation at the EHRF has been  very stable since the beginning  of  the 
contract for managing the PTDP (which contrasts with the Programme Unit itself). The manage-
ment of PTDP accounts for 60% of the EHRF activities. 
EHRF Budget 1996 
European Human Right Funds 
T  echn. Assistance Unit 
770.000 ECU 
850.000 ECU 
1.200.000 ECU 
100.000 ECU 
PTDP Technical Assistance 
Other Activities 
Total: 
74 
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The Programme Units in Phare and Tacis functioned from then on 
as  programme  coordinators.  The  EHRF  was  providing  technical 
assistance to  the  NGO part of these  programme coordinators  i_n 
Phare and Tacis, for the  advertising of  the  NGO part of the pro-
gramme, the assessment of applications, the contract preparation 
and  the  supervision  process.  This  role  was  restricted  to  the  so-
called macro project scheme. 
With the  extension to  Tacis countries the  Commission  started  in 
1993 also to select and support projects on  an  ad  hoc base.  For 
these so-called ad hoc or own  initiative projects no  formal  selec-
tion  process was set up.  Beginning  in  1993 Commission  funded 
projects  in  the  field  of democracy proposed  by EU  delegations. 
the Parliament and internal services in Phare and Tacis countries. 
According  to  the  interregulations  the  Head  of  Unit  was  the  re-
sponsible signatory  for projects under 300.000 ECU and for proj-
ects above 300.000 ECU,  responsibility went up to  Director level. 
The Advisory Group was informed about the  ad-hoc-projects but 
not involved in the decision process. 
Also  in  1993 the  Commission  included  a so-called  micro  project 
facility  into  the  PTDP.  These  are  projects  up  to  10.000  ECU 
funding which  are  normally selected and  managed under the  re-
sponsibility of  the  European  Union's delegations  in  these  coun-
tries. 
By the  end of  1993 the  threefold structure  had  been  developed 
under PTDP  which  since  then  has  been  improved  step  by step 
and extended to more countries but not changed in principle. 
In  1997 macro-projects were implemented in  all  Phare and Tacis 
countries, micro project facilities are  in  place only in  Phare coun-
tries.  For  Russia  the  micro  project  facility  will  start  in  autumn 
1997. Ad-hoc-projects  are  more  common  in  Tacis  countries  but 
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Share of  Grants 1113-1118 under Phare and Tacla 
per Project Type 
(Graphic 15) 
Micro Pro)ecta 
11% 
they also exist for Phare.  In February 1997 the formerly separated 
internal  management  of  the  Phare  and  the  Tacis  part  of  PTDP 
was integrated into a new PTDP Programme unit. 
Since  1992, the  PTDP  has continuously changed  both  its  man-
agement structure  but also  its  funding  schemes.  New types  of 
instruments have been developed with the micro-projects and the 
ad-hoc-projects. And the management has been partly contracted 
out to an external institution and partly reorganised. 
While  the  guidelines  and  procedures  are  very  clear  and  elabo-
rated for the macro project facility and the micro project facilities, 
the ad hoc/ own initiative facility has no comparable formal struc-
ture and procedures due to its more flexible needs. 
5.2 Macro-projects: A Successful Bottom Up Approach 
Macro-projects are the most well- known part of the PTDP. Macro-
projects are projects for non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
managed with technical assistance through the European Human 
Rights Foundation, operated through a call for proposals twice  a 
year and responding to needs identified by NGOs. The  available 
funding is at a maximum 200.000 ECU per project and the  NGO PTDP Evaluation Report  Organisation and Procedures 
has to  contribute 20°/o  of all funds.  1  0°/o  of the  NGO contribution 
can  be  made  in  kind.  Roughly  70°/o  of all  available funds of the 
PTDP have been given away as macro-projects. 
The macro project facility follows a bottom-up logic. After publicis-
ing  calls for proposals twice  a year NGOs tum  in  independently 
their proposals for projects. The EHRF will  help them through lo-
cal offices in Warsaw and Prague or the main office in Brussels to 
complete  the  proposals  and  it  also  encourages  an  increase  of 
Management Costs of PTDP 
Since the  EHRF  has  managed  the  PTDP,  a total  of  63.30.889  ECU  have 
been  given  as  grants for macro-projects.  The  shares  for Phare  and  Tacis 
and the administration costs for the EHRF have been: 
PTDP macro grants and administration costs EHRF 
Phare  34.683.580 ECU  Administration costs EHRF: 8.48 % 
Tacis  28.625.319 ECU  Administration costs EHRF: 8.81  % 
This figures do not give a complete picture of the overall administration cost 
of the program,  because one  has to  add  the internal  costs of the  Program 
Unit  (3  Programme manager,  1  secretary), the costs the Tacis  Democracy 
unit in  Moscow (appr.  300.000 ECU per year),  and the costs of  running the 
micro project facilities  in  the Phare countries as  part  of  the work of the EU 
delegations. 
For the internal costs in the Commission and the delegations no figures are 
available.  Because the PTDP  is  a comparatively complex  programme with 
several  local  offices  in  Central  Europe  and  a  established  administration 
structure in Brussels, any attempt to change the external contractor is bound 
to create technical, management and cost problems. 
(all data based on information EHRF and Programme Unit) 
applications  through  an  active  information  policy  (national  and 
regional  seminars,  publicising  of  material  and  PTDP  newsletter 
etc.). Since the start of PTDP the number of project proposals has 
increased  continuously  over the  years,  which  is  an  indicator of 
success. The average number of applicants per round is between 
400 and 600. 
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5.2. 1 The Selection Process 
The proposals are examined by the EHRF and divided into three 
groups: (1)  Recommended, (2)  Not recommended and (3)  Ineligi-
ble.  Ineligible project proposals normally count for about 20°/o  of 
the  total  and  are  usually outside  the  program guidelines (i.e.  no 
NGO and/or democracy relation). 
Eligibility 
In discussions with members of  parliament, NGO organisations in  Brussels and 
in the countries evaluated we  often found a great deal of misinterpretation of the 
criteria of eligibility for the PTDP. Some of the criticisms of the PTDP are related 
to  the exclusion  of  political  (party)  projects from  funding.  Although  this  is  ex-
pressed  very clearly in  the  regulations  for the  PTDP  obviously there  still  exist 
false perceptions about what can be funded under PTDP.  Although parties can-
not be recipients of PTDP funding, party foundations, for example, can be part-
ners in supporting NGO projects. 
Projects recommended for funding go through a detailed process. 
Each proposal is examined by different evaluators at a number of 
stages.  The  process of evaluation  starts  at the  EHRF where  all 
team  members read  each  proposal.  After a group discussion  in-
cluding all EHRF team members an  initial assessment of the pro-
posals on the basis of agreed criteria is  made. These criteria are 
already  indicated  in  the  application  form  together with  their  re-
spective weighting. These criteria are: quality of the project (55°/o), 
partnership (35°/o)  and specific aspects (1 0°/o,  i.e. minorities etc.). 
The  projects are  not explicitly balanced  by  countries or regional 
areas or areas of activities.  However, these criteria nevertheless 
play an implicit role. 
Where proposals seek to  build  on  existing projects tor which  no 
report has been received at the time of the deadline, the project is 
evaluated  on  its  merits,  but subsequently  not recommended  for 
this  reason.  The  criteria  have  been  amended  by  the  Advisory 
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After the  first  assessment by  the  EHRF  a list with  short project 
descriptions  for  all  eligible  projects  is  produced  and  forwarded 
with  the  scoring  of  the  assessment  to  the  Advisory  Group.  The 
Advisory Group discusses the  suggested projects and  makes an 
overall  recommendation.  This  can  and  does  include  changes  in 
the  list  of  projects  proposed  by  EHRF.  The  suggestions  of  the 
Advisory Group are then sent to the Commission for approval. 
Table 8: Number and Selection Relation of  Applications 
Application rounds .  Number of  Relation 
proposals  successful/ total 
1992  350  1:7 
1993  399  1:3 
1994  573  1:6 
April1995  406  1:7 
October 1995  559  1:14 
April1996  350  1:7 
October 1996  377  1:8 
May 1997  270  1:6 
After receiving an  approved list of projects from  the  Commission 
the  EHRF starts informing the  applicants and  preparing the  con-
tracts. This includes renegotiating the budgets to meet EU regula-
tions.  In  total  the  process  from  turning  in  the  proposal  until  the 
actual start of the project takes on  average  18  months.  In  some 
cases  it takes  up  to  36  months.  This  is  a  permanent  and  well 
known point of criticism. However, a more detailed analysis shows 
that from this time the  DG  I N  Commission itself needs on  aver-
age between 1  0 and twelve months for agreeing on  the prepared 
list,  signing  the  contracts  and  paying  the  first  instalment.  After 
finishing the project a NGO will wait for the final payment for an-
other two to three months. 
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Although we have not done an in depth analysis of the procedure 
in the DG  1 A,  in  all interviews the main problems identified were 
in  the  areas  of  contracting  and  financial  control.  The  selection 
process of projects was  criticised on occasion. However, we were 
unable  to  identify concrete  examples  to  substantiate  these  criti-
cisms and,  in  some instances, the  criticisms seem to  have  been 
linked  to  very  specific  interests  of  the  person  or  institution  in-
volved.  In  general the  selection  of projects - and this impression 
Table 9: Time-frame for Accepting and Starting a PTDP Macro-project 
Time  Task  Responsible 
End of April and end of Octo- Deadline  for  turning  in  pro- applicants (NGOs) 
ber  posals  for  macro-projects  at 
the EHRF 
six weeks  screening  of  all  proposals  and  EHRF 
writing  a  list  of  recommenda-
tions based  on  a scoring  sys-
tem 
one week  Discussion  of  recommended  EHRF,  Advisory  Group, 
projects with Advisory Group  PTDP Programme Unit 
three to five month  Discussion  and  acceptance  of  DG I AI Commission 
suggested  list  by  the  Com-
mission 
six to eight weeks  Renegotiating  of  budgets  for  EHRF/NGOs 
approved  projects  with  lead 
organisations.  Turning  in  of 
new budgets. 
three month  signing of contracts  DG I A/Commission 
six to eight weeks  request/invoice  for  first  pay- NGOs 
ments 
two to three months  money sent to NGOs  Commission 
two weeks to one month  Project start  NGOs 
Total time before project  start  (average):  18  month.  All  information  based  on 
interviews with the EHRF, the Programme Unit and selected NGOs. 
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was strengthened by the Democracy Conference in October 1997 
in Brussels - was seen as well balanced. 
Long delays in contracting and payments can  be partly explained 
in  terms  of  the  problems  in  the  recipients  countries,  e.g.  bank 
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parisons with  other donors and  institutions show that a time  be-
tween  nine month to  one year for approval of  proposals is  com-
mon. The Commission has discussed how to speed up the proce-
dure.  It was not part of our evaluation to  analyse this problem in 
detail. 
5.2.2 The Management of  PTDP Macro-projects by the EHRF 
The  internal  management  structure  of  the  EHRF  seems  to  us 
appropriate in  relation to their task. The EHRF staff has been ex-
tended with  regional  offices  in  Warsaw and  Prague  to  meet the 
growth and new demands. However, the  management (including 
project managers and  deputy project managers)  has  been  com-
paratively  stable  over  the  time.  Therefore  all  members  of  the 
EHRF team  have  been  able  to  build  up  specialist  knowledge  of 
their  countries  and  the  process  of  democratisation.  They  also 
have well  established and  good working  relations with  EU  Dele-
gations, Phare and Tacis Units, and other donors relevant for the 
development of NGOs and a civil society. 
During our evaluation we  had  on  several occasions the opportu-
nity to discuss with almost all team members of EHRF. We gained 
a favourable impression of their overall knowledge, their ability to 
place developments in a wider political context and relate them to 
ongoing projects. We think that the  "human  resources" available 
at the EHRF are excellent and well managed. 
The internal management structure of the  EHRF is clear and ori-
entated along the separation  between  Phare  and  Tacis and  the 
different countries.  Project and  deputy project managers  are  in-
volved at each stage of the project from application, project start 
to  evaluation. Country visits and  promotion  of  the  programme  is 
part of their activities. During these country visits EHRF managers 
contact projects, advise and support NGOs and can build up per-
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sonal experience on  the problems of NGOs with  PTDP.  Because 
the EHRF managers are also liaison persons for NGOs participa-
tion  in  the programme this clearly helps to  resolve problems and 
avoid  misunderstanding.  The  EHRF  thinks,  that this  "hands  on" 
management  approach  has  limited  the  number  of  projects  that 
have completely failed or closed. According to  EHRF, instead of a 
20°/o  failure  foreseen  and  discussed  by  the  Commission  at  the 
outset, the rate of failure is less than 4°/o. 
The  regional offices of EHRF established in  Warsaw and in  Pra-
gue  and the  local  agents are  important instruments.  They serve 
as  a  contact  point for  local  and  regional  NGOs  for advice  and 
information on  the programme and on problems with implementa-
tion.  From our visits to several countries and the discussions with 
NGOs the regional offices and the local agents seem to be a effi-
cient instrument to  deal with  many matters at a local level rather 
then  referring them to  Brussels.  Additionally, the  regional  offices 
are important in order to  monitor projects more closely and to tar-
get the application of projects more to  specific needs relevant to 
individual countries. 
Monitoring and evaluation of projects is  also done by the  EHRF. 
The EHRF uses two  instruments: a system of reporting and proj-
ect visits and evaluations by EHRF team members.  Each  project 
is required to produce interim and final  reports including financial 
reporting.  The  formats  are  in  line  with  standard  Commission  re-
quirements.  Many  NGOs  still  find  these  reporting  requirements 
overly complex and  bureaucratic.  However,  if  there  is  a general 
need for justification of expenditure, the basic format used by the 
EHRF seems necessary and appropriate. 
Additionally the  EHRF team tries to  visit all projects at least once 
and to participate in activities put forward by NGOs (like seminars, 
conferences etc.)  From  the  reports we  have seen  these  evalua-
tions  give  valuable  insights  how  to  improve  projects  and  the PTDP Evaluation Report  Organisation and Procedures 
PTDP  in  general.  Due  to  limitations  in  staff  numbers,  time  and 
budget one can  not recommend a close evaluation of all projects. 
This would definitely not be cost effective. 
All  project  management  activities  and  the  monitoring  of  single 
projects  are  reported  in  weekly  project  management  meetings. 
Every three  months the  Director of  EHRF  and  the  project man-
agement  staff  have  a  meeting  (including  the  regional  project 
managers from Prague and Warsaw) during which they brief each 
other on the development of the  PTDP macro-projects in  the vari-
ous countries. 
5.2.3 Reporting to PTDP Programme Unit and Commission 
Given  the  EHRFs central  role  in  managing  the  PTDP's  macro 
project a well established and detailed reporting system is of great 
importance for the  Commission  to  ensure  the  political  and  eco-
nomic  control  over  all  activities.  This  is  guaranteed  through  a 
number of instruments and no complaints have been made during 
our evaluation  from  task  managers  working  inside  the  Commis-
sion with the PTDP. 
The  EHRF  provides  to  the  Phare  and  Tacis  Task  managers  a 
monthly  report  on  ongoing  projects,  covering  administrative  is-
sues. These reports are the basis for monthly meetings with  task 
managers to discuss open points. 
For Financial Control the  EHRF produces regular reports on  con-
tracts requests.  It was not part of our evaluation to  analyse these 
in  any form.  After all  projects under each  yearly financial  round 
are completed,  EHRF produces an  overall  report.  This has been 
done for projects financed under the  1993 round.  We found that 
report informative, well structured and adequate. 
Every six  month  the  EHRF  writes  a report  on  the  PTDP  for the 
meetings of the  Advisory Group. These  reports cover more gen-
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eral and strategic questions. They are  clearly written  and  include 
concisely  existing  problems  and  strategic  recommendations  for 
further improvement of PTDP. 
For a broader public the  EHRF  has produced booklets including 
all  macro  and  micro-projects  funded  during  the  1993  - 1995 
budgets. Additionally. a first issue of a PTDP newsletter was pub-
lished in June 1997. 
The  information  available on  PTDP  macro-projects seems there-
fore  internally as well as externally  good. 
Grants In 
Thousand 
ECU 
Macro Project Grants 1993-1996 under Phare and Tacis 
per Area of Activity 
(Graphic 16) 
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5.3 Ad-hoc-projects and Own Initiatives 
Compared  to  the  elaborated  and  differentiated  selection  and 
monitoring process for macro-projects the ad  hoc project facilities 
under PTDP  are  much  less structured  and  ruled  by transparent 
regulations.  Ad  hoc or own  initiative  projects  are  put forward  by 
the Commission to  react on  specific needs and urgent requests. 
They have been introduced under the PTDP  1993 budget line on (7) 
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a comparatively small scale tor Tacis and since then extended to 
Phare  and  Tacis.  Under Phare  they account for only 8°/o  of the 
budget, under Tacis they account for 31 °/o. 
In  Phare  and  Tacis  the  ad  hoc facilities  operate  on  the  basis of 
identification  of  prio~ities that  should  be  given  special  attention 
throughout  the  year.  These  are  either  priorities  named  by  the 
Commission, the  Parliament,  or the  EU  Delegations.  For  Phare, 
tor example, in  1994, Roma,  Journalists and  anti-corruption proj-
ects were on  the  list of priorities.  In  1995, national minorities and 
anticorruption were important. 
The  ad-hoc-projects  under Tacis  cover  a much  larger group  of 
activities, including monitoring of elections, training of journalists, 
and  media monitoring by the  European  Institute tor the  Media in 
Dusseldorf.  They  also  include  activities  in  Western  Europe  like 
conferences on PTDP and democracy development. 
The  projects are  managed  by  the  Phare  and  Tacis  PTDP  Task 
managers who  have  been  supported  by  an  external  consultant. 
Seeing  the  small  numbers  of  PTDP  task managers  (2}  there  is 
clearly a limit to how many projects they can directly select, man-
age and monitor. For Russia a special Tacis Democracy Unit (one 
task  manager}  is  funded  in  Moscow  which  helps  to  select  and 
manage ad-hoc-projects. The Unit was set up in  1996 and has an 
impressive  record  of  activities.  Russia  (Moscow}  is  clearly  the 
most  important  single  country  under  the  Tacis  part  of  PTDP. 
However, given the whole architecture of PTDP the strategic role 
of a PTDP country office remains unclear. 
In  general,  the  process  and  method  of  selection  of  ad-hoc-
projects  is  not  transparent  to  a  broader  public.  We  could  not 
identity an established scheme how to decide on ad-hoc-projects. 
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List of selected ad-hoc-projects (examples) 
Phare: 
Regional Roma Programme  Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia  300.000 ECU 
Contractor: Autonomia Foundation Budapest 
Anti Corruption Strategy  Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and others  49.976 ECU 
Contractor: Transparency International Berlin 
Journalist Training Project  all Phare countries  440.000 ECU 
Inter-Press Service, Rome 
Media for Democracy  all Phare countries  300.000 ECU 
International Federation of Journalists 
Media Monitoring Romania  Romania  94.073 ECU 
European Institute for Media Duesseldorf 
Ethnic Conflict Prevention  Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia  196.573 ECU 
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Hague 
Corruption and Crime  All Phare countries  176.880 ECU 
Council of Europe 
Minorities in CEEC  All Phare countries  180.200 ECU 
Council of Europe 
Tacls: 
Media Monitoring  several NIS countries  793.228 ECU 
European Institute of Media (framework contract) 
Democracy, Rule of Law  Russia  1  .182.000 ECU 
Council of Europe 
Legal System Reform  Ukraine  524.000 ECU 
Council of Europe 
Legal reform and Media  Moldova  148.000 ECU 
Council of Europe 
Training Young Parliamentarian  Russia  271.670 ECU 
Moscow School Political Studies 
Seminars Human Rights  Russia  261.308 ECU 
Advanced Educational Training Institute Moscow 
Assistance Elections  Russia!Chechnya  140.000 ECU 
OSCE-QDHR 
Training Journalists  Russia  199.785 ECU 
Gasperi Foundation Rome/ Moscow State University 
Training members Parliament  Ukraine  949.340 ECU 
EU Delegations!Europresse Paris (framework contract) 
Training Parliamentarians  Armenia  199.335 ECU 
CU for Armenia 
Support Constitutional Law  Uzbekistan  1  81 .290 ECU 
Tacis CUI Authorities from Uzbekistan 
Promotion Independent Media  Belarus  1  50.000 ECU 
Swedish Institute Education of Journalists 
Assistance Parliament Election  Ukraine  1  50.000 ECU 
EU Delegation 
Training Parliamentarians  Kazakhstan  150.000 ECU 
EU Delegation 
According to  information given to  the Advisory Group on  ad-hoc-
projects, the selection for Phare  projects is  done in  consultation 
with the Human Rights Unit of DG1 A and for Tacis projects upon 
the recommendations of the  Moscow Democracy Unit. Proposals 
are presented at the Advisory Group which is then informed about 
the selections. Phare consulted the Advisory Group on the portion 
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of  the  Democracy  funds  for  ad-hoes  at  the  beginning  of  each 
year, Tacis did not. 
The accessibility of the funds for a broader public seems poor as 
no information about them is given on larger scale. Even in official 
publications  of  the  EU  the  ad-hoc-projects are  not always  men-
tioned.  In  a coordination  meeting of  Phare  and Tacis  NGO  Pro-
grammes in  March  1996 participants from  EU  Delegations asked 
for more information how Phare and Tacis ad hoc facilities can be 
used and which activities are carried out under these budgets. 
Although the need for an ad hoc scheme seems clear in  terms of 
a hands on approach, a direct influence on specific fields and the 
ability to  react quickly to  immediate political problems,  it remains 
unclear whether some  of  the  projects funded  should  not be  in-
cluded under the macro project facility because there are no rele-
vant differences in  project design and  outcome. Additionally,  the 
management capacities of the two Task managers in  Brussels do 
not seem sufficient to organise the overall PTDP scheme, prepare 
the  selection  of  ad  hoc/ own  initiatives,  and  monitor these  proj-
ects.  In addition, the organisational support of the unit (secretary, 
phone lines etc.) appears to be rather poor. 
As is the case with the macro-projects, a hands on approach does 
increase cost-effectiveness. One recipient of a large ad  hoc proj-
ect told  us  that they had  made  much  better use  of funds when 
they were in  close contact with the  manager in  Brussels and this 
allowed a certain flexibility in the use of funds. They then had an 
incentive to use resources efficiently so  that money saved could 
be used to  extend the project. Subsequently, they had  less per-
sonal  contact  and  had  to  follow  paper  guidelines  much  more 
closely; new activities could not be started without additional for-
mal approval. Hence, it was easier simply to spend all the money 
even when it was not really needed to  complete  implementation 
of the project in a formal sense. 
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For the  result and  achievements of single  ad-hoc-projects,  there 
is no comparable comprehensive monitoring and reporting system 
to the methods used for macro-projects. This seems to  be  clearly 
necessary if the ad-hoc-projects are continued over a longer time. 
5.4 Micro-projects 
The  micro  project facilities  funded  under PTDP  are  normally di-
rectly organised in the countries by the EU Delegations. There are 
yearly  budgets  assigned  to  micro-projects  in  each  country. 
(Ranging  from  80.000  ECU  for  Estonia  up  to  520.000  ECU  for 
Romania).  In  total the  micro-projects add  up to  19°/o  of all  PTDP 
grants under Phare.  The  actual  limit per project is  10.000  ECU. 
For  Tacis  micro  facilities  have  been  approved  for  Russia  and 
Ukraine  and  discussed  for  Belarus,  Georgia  and  Kazakhstan. 
However, during our evaluation none of these facilities were yet in 
operation. 
Estonia 
Share of Micro Project Grants 1993 and 1994 
per Target Country 
(Graphic 17) 
Poland  Czech Rep. 
Bulgaria 
Romania 
Each  Delegation  during  the  last three  years  has  established  its 
own  mechanism  to  announce,  select  and  manage  the  micro-
projects.  In  most  cases  local  foundations  and  committees  are PTDP Evaluation Report  Organisation CW1d  Procedures 
used  for  the  selection  and  assessment  of  applications.  Guide-
lines,  application  forms  and  procedures  are  quite  similar  in  all 
countries.  In  some  countries the  EU  Delegations have given the 
micro  project facilities to  the  Civil  Society Development  Found~­
tions  which  run  similar  funding  schemes  financed  partly  under 
national Phare budgets. Although this has advantages in terms of 
economies  of  scale,  it  also  has  the  disadvantage  that  these 
Foundations may be constrained by national Phare rules. 
Micro-projects  cover  the  same  area  of  activities  as  macro-
projects.  However,  they  require  much  less  experience  in  project 
management  from  an  applicant  and  are  therefore  much  more 
suitable for smaller NGOs.  The  micro-projects have  a very good 
reputation  in  all  countries visited  and  are  seen  by all  experts as 
the most efficient way to develop NGO capacity in the short term. 
The  EU  Delegations also welcome the  opportunity to  have small 
funds they can  hand out directly, although the personnel capaci-
ties necessary to start such a facility have been underestimated in 
some cases. 
The  process  of  advertising  the  micro-projects  and  selecting  the 
applications seems appropriate  in  the  countries we  have visited. 
The monitoring must necessarily be  selective taking into account 
the  small  amount given  per project.  The  PTDP  Unit  in  Brussels 
receives reports on micro facilities and lists of the projects funded 
every year. 
For the special case  of Bosnia and  Herzegovina a special micro 
project scheme was initiated with  a sum  of 200.000 ECU  in  April 
1996 and the  EHRF was asked for technical assistance.  Follow-
ing the Commission decision in April 1996 a call for proposals was 
published which resulted in  97 applications for micro-projects. 18 
projects were  selected  and  the  Commission  - impressed  by  the 
high  demand  and  quality  of  projects  - subsequently  agreed  to 
fund further 28 applications from  PTDP  and  LIEN.  This  must be 
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seen as a very fast and efficient realisation of a micro project fa-
cility in a case of need. However, problems occurred later on due 
to  problems  with  payments  procedures.  As  a  report  from  the 
EHRF to the Advisory Group in  October 1996 says: "The  impres-
sive  speed  and  efficiency  of  the  operation  {recommendation  in 
April, launch in  May, selection in July) has been somewhat dimin-
ished by the  subsequent payments procedure. The  EU  Office  in 
Sarajevo was discovered not to have the correct bank account to 
make payments,  the  procurement agent refused  to  handle  NGO 
grants  as  being  outside  their  contractual  remit,  and  the  use  of 
EHRF to make the payments has been frustrated by non-payment 
of the grant." 
5.5 Findings and Recommendations 
The overall structure of  PTDP with  three  independent project fa-
cilities {macro-projects, ad-hoc-projects/own  initiatives and  micro-
projects) can only be explained historically. It is mainly a response 
to  a  fast  changing  economic  and  political  environment  in  the 
Phare  and  Tacis  countries  and  has  not been  based  on  a priori 
planned  programme  structure.  There  are  some  advantages  in 
having three programme elements.  However, the danger of coor-
dination and management problems increases with  a larger num-
ber of independently managed elements. Especially in the light of 
the very limited resources of only two task managers in the PTDP 
unit. 
Overall, the  growing  request for support and  the  increase  in  the 
number of projects over the  past years indicate a good manage-
ment performance of PTDP - the existing problems with delays of 
contract and  payments.  The  cost  effectiveness  of  the  manage-
ment of projects of  this type  is  always difficult to  judge.  For the 
macro projects it requires an  intensity of management, staff time PTOP Evaluation Report  Organisation and Procedures 
and background knowledge, which is almost impossible to organ-
ise inside the Commission. Therefore the contracting of the EHRF 
(or another organisation) for technical assistance seems to be the 
only possible solution. Related to  the overall funds of PTDP  and 
the  size  of  projects  financed  (macro-projects  100.000-150.000 
ECU)  the  management  capacities  of  the  EHRF  might  appear 
high, but it is comparatively small related to the countries involved 
and number of projects funded. 
An  issue which impacts directly on  programme management and 
performance is the long time it takes the Commission to  manage 
its part of the  Programme, i.e. signing contracts and making pay-
ments. These problems have been mentioned from the beginning 
of the PTDP, but not been solved so far. A possible solution might 
be to contract out the management of contracts and payments to 
an external institution. 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1  The Need for the PTDP 
In  Agenda 2000, five  Central European countries have been sin-
gled out to  begin  negotiations about accession  to  the  European 
Union. Three of these countries - Poland,  Hungary and Estonia -
were  included  in  this  study.  Commissioner Hans van  den  Broek 
has  made  it clear that the  selection  of these countries does not 
imply  a  new  division  between  'ins'  and  'outs'.  Enlargement is  a 
continuing process. There are only 'ins' and  'pre-ins'  .(See Finan-
cial Times 22 September 1997) 
Our study included  'ins',  'pre-ins'  as  well  as  countries  that have 
not yet applied to  join the  Union. While the  'ins' and pre-ins' are 
clearly  more  advanced  down  the  road  to  democracy,  our study 
identified weaknesses in the process of democratisation in  all the 
countries  we  investigated.  While  there  were  some  common 
weaknesses - for example,  in  areas such  as  public administra-
tion, the rule  of law, or political culture - it was also the case that 
the obstacles to democratisation are specific to each country. 
Democracy assistance is a comparatively minor instrument in  as-
sisting the process of democratisation. Of its nature, such  assis-
tance can  never be more than enabling, helping those individuals 
in  society who already are working for democracy. Moreover, the 
scale  of democracy  assistance  is  nowhere  commensurate  with 
the magnitude of the challenge. As Carothers put in,  in a percep-
tive study of US democracy assistance to Romania: 
" When one steps back and considers the enormity of the task of 
democratisation in  a country such  as  Romania - drastically alter-
ing the basic relationship of the individual to the  state, reshaping 
the very notion and  limits of what is political,  and transforming a 
fundamentally  undemocratic  state  apparatus  - the  democracy 
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assistance  programs  appear  as  dots  on  a  large  screen." 
(Carothers, 1996, pp. 91-2) 
The  Phare Tacis  Democracy Programme  is  relatively small  com-
pared with overall Western democracy assistance. Moreover, it is 
only  one  element of  an  array  of  programmes  funded  under the 
Phare  and  Tacis  programmes  aimed  at  assisting  democracy. 
Nevertheless,  our study  concludes  that the  PTDP  is  a valuable 
programme.  Its main political impact is indirect via its contribution 
to  the  creation  of a lively  NGO sector in  all  nine  countries.  This 
sector  both  contributes  to  the  process  of  democratisation  and 
provides a bulwark against the reversal of the process of democ-
ratisation which  is  happening  in  some  countries,  notably Belarus 
and  Kazakhstan.  Of particular,  and  often  underestimated, impor-
tance  is  the  fact that democracy assistance  can  be  seen  as  an 
investment  in  the  people  who  receive  support.  The  practical 
knowledge, the contacts and the positive values given through the 
democracy assistance projects  have a multiplier effect since they 
enable key persons to develop new ideas. and fresh perspectives 
for  the  improvement  of  civil  society.  What  has  been  created 
largely with foreign funds is a moral community in  all these coun-
tries, groups and individuals who are essential to the construction 
of a democratic political culture, who lobby for democratic change 
and who constitute an ongoing form of public education. 
Our first recommendation, therefore, is that the PTDP should be 
continued and the annual budget line should be increased. In 
order to increase stability and certainty, an agreed time frame of 
three  or five years should  be established  during which  the 
programme would  be  expected to continue. After this  time  a 
new evaluation has to  be done. While we  think that the  priorities 
for each  country should be  specific to  each  country,  we  do  not 
consider that it is a good idea to be more selective and to  focus 
on particular countries or regions. It is important to sustain current Conclusions and Recommendations  PTDP Evaluation Report 
levels of assistance to  'ins' and 'pre-ins' in  order to  prepare them 
for accession and because many other Western donors are mov-
ing out of  the  region.  At the  same  time,  it is  crucial  to  continue 
assistance to the Tacis countries because the problems they face 
are  much  greater than  those  faced  by the  Phare  countries.  The 
PTDP can  be a very useful mechanism for compensating for any 
divisions that seem  to  be  arising  from  the  selectivity of  the  en-
largement process.  It is  a way of bringing together 'ins',  'pre-ins' 
and 'outs'. 
The PTDP's main advantage compared with other Western assis-
tance programme is its visibility. As we describe in Chapter. 4, the 
EU  label offers local  NGOs legitimacy and  prestige.  In  countries 
like Slovakia or Belarus, it is also a form of protection against an 
intrusive  government.  In  Belarus,  where  the  Sores  Foundation 
has been closed, Tacis funded programmes are,  for the time be-
ing,  tolerated.  Precisely because  of  this  visibility,  which  affects 
tens of thousands of people in some countries, the  PTDP is also 
a  rather  cost-effective  way  of  signalling  the  EU's  own  commit-
ments to democracy and civil society. In order to build on  this ad-
vantage,  a  second  recommendation  is  that  the  programme 
should be renamed  as the  EU  Democracy Programme  and 
that  the  Phare  and  Tacis  labels  which  have  less  resonance 
should be dropped. 
The  PTDP's  main  advantage  compared  with  other  Phare  and 
Tacis programmes is the fact that the PTDP does not have to be 
approved  by  governments  and  that  the  selection  procedure  is 
largely 'bottom-up'. Thus NGOs in  the  recipient countries help to 
shape  the  priorities  and  thereby  alert  the  European  Union  and 
governments, sometimes through their Western partners, to  new 
issues. Thus the Roma issue or the deteriorating situation in  Be-
larus were signalled through the PTDP. Thus the recipients of the 
PTDP  represent a valuable  repository of  knowledge  about  local 
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conditions  which  can  provide  a significant  antidote  to  elite-level 
information which tends to be provided by diplomats and experts. 
More use could be made of this  benefit of the PTDP. The recipi-
ents  could  be  consulted  when  planning  overall  policy  towards 
particular countries.  A third  recommendation  is  that  regular  in-
formal  round  tables,  of  the  kind  organised  for  the  study, 
should be  held in each country, involving the recipients, the 
EU delegations, desk officers, and outside experts, to discuss 
the priorities for democratisation in the country concerned. 
Another advantage of the PTDP compared with other democracy 
assistance programmes is the way it encourages East-West and 
East-East European partnerships. 
The overall Phare and Tacis programmes do, of course, influence 
the  process  of  democracy.  Support  for  public  administration  or 
education may be just as important for democracy, perhaps even 
more  important, than  democracy assistance.  In  particular,  all  the 
Round Tables emphasised the importance of  education.  Democ-
racy  criteria  should  be  used  for all  projects  and  care  should  be 
taken that other elements of the programme,  e.g.  support for pri-
vatisation, are consistent with democracy goals. 
6.2 The Content of the PTDP 
The  PTDP  has  three  main  components:  micro-projects,  macro-
projects, and ad hoc projects. By and large, the division between 
the these components works well  although the  rationale for each 
component could be  made more  explicit so  that the  components 
are  organically linked.  Our conclusions  on  the  individual  compo-
nents of the programme are: 
a) The micro-projects are very successful in providing support  f~r 
grass-roots  initiatives. They  need  to  be  extended to all  coun-
tries as soon as  possible and  co-ordinated  with  other com-Conclusions and Recommendations  PTOP Evaluation Report 
plementary  EU  programmes  especially  the  Foundations  for 
Civil Society Development and LIEN. 
b)  Micro-projects  need  to  be  complemented  by  macro-projects. 
The  macro-projects  are  the  most  visible  component  of  the  pro-
gramme. They have been important for institution-building and for 
partnerships.  For the  macro-projects,  NGO development has ac-
counted for nearly half the projects and this  has made  a signifi-
cant contribution to the institutional growth of larger NGOs. NGOs 
receiving  micro-projects  have  been  supported  by  larger  NGOs 
receiving macro-projects and have often been able to graduate to 
macro-projects. European partnerships have also been important. 
The  PTDP  has  allowed  and  speeded  up the  exchange  of  know 
how between east and west and the building up of highly valuable 
networks. Many groups from Western Europe have extended their 
outreach  towards  Eastern  Europe  and  NIS  thus  contributing  to 
political  acceptance  and  knowledge  in  the  West.  Moreover,  the 
learning  process  has  not  just  been  one-way.  Western  groups 
have  gained  understanding  of  East  European  problems,  they 
have  learned  new  perspectives  on  democracy  which  has  also 
helped  them  to  reassess  their  own  situation.  In  recent  years, 
East-East partnerships  have  been  growing  in  importance.  Part-
nerships  have  worked  better  in  Phare  countries  than  in  Tacis 
countries partly because  it takes  time  to  establish  effective  and 
equal partnerships and partly because  NGOs  in  Tacis countries, 
especially in what are generally considered domestic policy areas 
like  civil  liberties,  have  difficulty identifying  appropriate  partners. 
NGOs in TACIS countries are particularly keen  to  establish  East-
East partnerships so as to learn from similar experiences. 
We recommend that macro-projects should be maintained and 
explicitly  focused  on  institution-building  and  partnerships. 
Thus  institution-building  should  be  taken  into  account when  se-
lecting  projects  even  if  the  projects  are  not  explicitly  aimed  at 
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NGO  development.  In  order to  strengthen  partnerships  in  Tacis 
countries, it could useful  to organise partnership conferences 
or workshops, especially in Tacis countries to which Western 
and  Eastern  NGOs  interested  in  establishing  partnerships 
would be invited. 
c) The ad hoc projects account tor a significant share of the PTDP 
budget especially in  Tacis countries. The ad  hoc facility is espe-
cially useful for two types of project. First, multi-country funding or 
horizontal projects  have  been  important.  Three  valuable  exam-
ples  are  the  media monitoring  project,  the  Roma  project  or the 
Transparency International project. Secondly, the ad hoc facility is 
useful tor emergencies where the selection procedure tor macro-
projects  would  take  too  long.  In  addition  to  these  two  types  of 
projects, the ad hoc facility has been used tor other types of proj-
ect.  First,  it  has been  used  tor joint projects with  other interna-
tional institutions, tor example, the  OSCE  for election  monitoring 
or the  Council of  Europe, to  help new members meet the condi-
tions of memberships. Secondly, it has been used for a miscella-
neous  collection  of  projects  which  could  as  easily  have  been 
treated  as  macro-projects  and  might  have  benefited  from  the 
more formal and transparent selection and monitoring procedures 
adopted tor macro-projects. 
Therefore,  we  recommend  that  ad  hoc  projects  should  only 
consist of horizontal  programmes  and  urgent projects and 
political priorities as specified in the financing proposal. Joint 
programmes  with  other  international  institutions should  be 
funded under a separate budget line. The procedures for se-
lecting and monitoring ad hoc projects should be more trans-
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6.3 Management of the PTDP 
The management of the PTDP  up to the selection process works 
relatively well. For this reason, we do not think there is any reason 
to  tinker with  current procedures.  In  particular, the  European Hu-
man  Rights Foundation seems to be relatively effective in  manag-
ing  the  selection  procedures for macro-projects.  Personal  con-
tacts are very important in the choice of projects and in monitoring 
implementation. Our study found that the efficiency of the macro-
projects was greatest in  those  countries where  the  EHRF  had a 
local staffperson. Well-written proposals are  no  substitute for on 
the  spot evaluation.  Moreover,  individual  monitoring  could  allow 
greater  flexibility  in  contractual  requirements  which  could  also 
improve  efficiency.  To  further  enhance  cost-effectiveness,  we 
recommend that there should be more local staff to assist se-
lection and monitoring of projects, especially macro-projects 
and ad  hoc projects. In  order to  reduce  unnecessary work and 
disappointment, we  also think it would be helpful to introduce a 
pre-proposal phase of say one month for which potential ap-
plicants are asked to prepare a two page proposal. Unsuitable 
applicants could be screened out at this stage so that in the final 
competition,  only  serious  proposals  are  considered  and  some 
70°/o  of  applicants  can  expect  to  succeed.  Serious  applicants 
could request advice in preparing proposals. 
There are however serious problems in the procedures for issuing 
contracts  and  making  payments.  This  applies  both  to  macro-
projects and ad  hoc projects. These problems damage the  repu-
tation of the programme and the effectiveness of single projects. 
NGOs do  not have  sufficient resources  or  borrowing  abilities  to 
tide over delays in funding; they are always on the edge of a cash 
flow  catastrophe.  We  came  across  cases  where  projects  had 
been seriously undermined by slow contracting procedures lead-
ing  to  loss of  staff and  morale.  One  Estonian  NGO  interviewed 100 
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complained about" top down treatment by the  EU  ......  the  EU  is 
very particular about deadlines when it concerns reports or appli-
cations  but  regularly  misses  deadlines  itself  when  it  comes  to 
sending  money  to  NGOs."  The  announcement  of  realistic  time 
frames  during  the  application  process  which  has  been  decided 
recently by the Commission could improve the situation. One way 
or another, the procedures for issuing contracts and  making 
payments must be totally overhauled, perhaps by contracting 
them out. PTOP Evaluation Report  References 
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